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Abstract
This Note argues that religion and state cannot be separated in Israel. Part I presents the
historical connection between the Jewish nation and the land of Israel and its impact on Israel’s
legal system. Part I also examines the current legal status of Jewish law in Israel. Part II discusses
proposed models for resolving the religion-state conflict in Israel. Part III defends the integration
of Jewish law into Israeli law, arguing that incorporating only the national and cultural elements of
Judaism into Israeli policy, while ignoring its religious components, is insufficient to sustain the
notion of Israel as a Jewish state.
COMPETING VISIONS OF THE JEWISH STATE:
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING FREEDOM OF
RELIGION IN ISRAEL
Basheva E. Genut*
INTRODUCTION
As the only democracy in the Middle East' and the only Jew-
ish State2 in the World, Israel is faced with the concomitant task
of preserving the unity of the Jewish nation and promoting and
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. Testimony Sept. 20, 1995, Richard A. Heilman President Christians'Israel Public Action
Campaign, House International Relations Committee, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. (Sept. 20, 1995),
available in WESTLAW, database CONGTMY.
Israel is the only country in the region of the Middle East which has free and
open elections, freedom of the press and freedom of religion, an independent
judiciary and a free and open society .... This is in contrast to the surround-
ing nations of the Middle East, whose peoples have continued to suffer from
the absence of civil and human rights while their leaders keep a firm grip on
power by oppressive and feudal means.
Id.; Testimony Apr. 25, 1994, Neal M. Sher Executive Director American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. (Apr. 25, 1994), available in WESTLAW, database
CONGTMY. "[Israel] is a fellow democracy in a region populated by authoritarian and
extremist regimes." Id. 138 CONG. REc. E920-02 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1992) (statement of
Hon. Les Aucoin, reading letter written by Larry Gold), available in WESTLAW,
database CONGTMY. "Israel, as the only democracy in the Middle East, serves as a
strong bulwark of freedom against this tide [Islamic Fundamentalism] . . . ." Id. 138
CONG. REc. E1986-04 (daily ed. June 25, 1992) (statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey),
available in WESTLAW, database CONGTMY. "In the Middle East millions of people
live without suffrage, without civil liberties, without human rights. In this parched re-
gion, democracy can barely take hold - never mind survive and prosper - except in
one oasis. That oasis for democracy ... is, of course, Israel." Id.
2. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 Laws of the State of
Israel (L.S.I.) 3 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration]. Israel's Declaration of Independence
declared Israel as the Jewish state.
Accordingly, We, Members of the People's Council, Representatives of the
Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement ... by Virtue of
Our National and Historic Right and on the Strength of the Resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly, Hereby Declare the Establishment of the
State of Israel .... This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be
masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.
Id. at 3, 4. The Declaration does not define what it means to be a Jewish state. GARY
JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1993). Israelis have competing conceptions regarding what functioning as a
Jewish state entails. Id.; See Norman L. Cantor, Religion and State in Israel and the United
States, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 185, 203 (1988) (discussing competing conceptions of
Israel as Jewish State).
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protecting civil rights against government intrusion.3 Often,
Jewish law and individual rights clash and Israel is forced to ele-
vate one above the other.4 As a relatively young state, Israel is
still attempting to precisely define the dimensions of its demo-
cratic nature and the parameters of the relationship between the
individual and the community within its borders.5
In shaping Israeli policy, the Knesset,6 Israel's legislature,
and the Supreme Court of Israel have looked to older, more es-
tablished democracies for guidance.' Israel has emulated U.S.,
English, and European legal principles and adopted them as its
own.' Despite such influence, Israel's unique geography,9 na-
3. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3, 4 (Isr.) (guaranteeing that Israel isJewish State and
that freedom of religion will be protected).
4. See Rabbinic Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, art. 1, 7 L.S.I. 139
(1953) (Isr.) [hereinafter Marriage and Divorce Law] (declaring application ofJewish
law to marriages and divorces of Jews in Israel). Jewish law governing marriage and
divorce is viewed as restrictive and forcing its application on all Jews, regardless of their
individual beliefs, is considered coercive by some Israeli citizens. Shimon Shetreet, Free-
doa of Religion and Freedom From Religion: A Dialogue, 4 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 194, 211
(1974).
5. SeeJAcOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 18-54 (analyzing Israeli pluralism).
6. SAMUEL SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 1 (1985). The Knesset,
translated as "assembly," is Israel's legislative body. Id.
7. See Aharon Barak, Freedom of Speech in Israel: The Impact of the American Constitu-
tion, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 241, 243, 248 (1988) (discussing examples of Supreme
Court of Israel utilizing U.S. cases, articles, and books). See also DAPHNA SHARFMAN,
LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION: CiviL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 44 (1993) (quoting Y.S. Sha-
pira, member of political party Mapai, regarding English influence on Israel's legal
system). Shapira stated that:
I think the fact that the vast majority received their political education as a
whole or in part under the British mandatory government had a great influ-
ence ... it is possible that if England had been different, let's say if it would
have been like France or Germany, a constitution would have been considered
indispensable for independence.
Id.; Amos Shapira, Why Israel Has No Constitution, 37 ST. Louis U. LJ. 283, 285 (1993)
(discussing Israel's inheritance of English legal tradition).
8. See, e.g., H.C. 65/51 Jabotinsky and Kook v. Weizmann, 5 Piskei Din (P.D.) 801,
translated in I Selected Judgments of the State of Israel (S.J.) 75 (1951) (Isr.) (citing
one English case and nine U.S. cases); H.C. 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior, 7
P.D. 871, translated in 1 S.J. 90 (1953) (Isr.) (citing eight English cases and nine U.S.
cases); H.C. 69/81 Bassil Abu Aita, et al. v. Regional commander ofJudea and Samaria,
37(2) P.D. 197, translated in 7 S.J. 1 (1981) (Isr.) (citing five English cases, one Italian
case, and two U.S. cases); H.C. 153/83 Levi v. Southern District Police Commander,
38(2) P.D. 393, translated in 7 SJ. 109 (1983) (Isr.) (citing three English cases, one Irish
case, and nine U.S. cases); H.C. 428/86 Barzilai, Adv. v. Government of Israel, translated
in 6 SJ. 1 (1986) (Isr.) (citing eight English cases and thirteen U.S. cases).
9. LEONARDJ. FEIN, POLITICS IN ISRAEL 1 (1967). Israel is a small country consisting
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tional and political experience,1" and culture1 distinguish it
from other democracies.1 2 The laws of other countries are insuf-
ficient, therefore, to address Israel's uncommon situation. 3
For most of Israel's history, it has been in a constant state of
war with its neighbors. 14 Consequently, Israel has channeled its
energies primarily to maintaining national security 5 Although
still plagued with terrorist attacks and indiscriminate killing, 6
Israel is now focusing inward, examining the relationship be-
tween Jewish and secular law in its legal system and attempting
to extend legislative protection to individual rights.'7
of approximately 8000 square miles. Id. Israel is one-third the size of Lake Michigan.
Id.
10. Id. The roots of Israel's political institutions can be traced to the organization
of the Jewish community in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel and
Jewish law. Id.
11. Id. Most of Israel's adult citizens were born in other countries and brought
diverse elements of other cultures to Israel. Id.
12. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting interview with Avraham Ravitz in Israeli
Democracy 23 (1990)). Ravitz, head of the Degel HaTorah religious party, stated in re-
sponse to a proposed bill of rights that:
In my opinion, the current version of the human rights bill imitates the bill of
rights of those civilized nations-that club to which we like to flatter ourselves as
belonging. But it is no secret that we are different from other nations of the
world; we have defined Israel as ajewish state .... This is made quite explicit
in no less than the country's Proclamation of Independence.
Id.
13. See Barak, supra note 7 at 241-44, 247, 248 (contrasting U.S. and Israeli govern-
mental structures and explaining limitations of U.S. experience to Israel).
14. See CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 146-51, 174-
78, 197-205, 227-31, 267-71 (1988) (outlining five Israeli wars: War of Independence,
1948, Suez Crisis, 1956, Six Day War, 1967, Yom Kippur War, 1973, and War in Leba-
non, 1981-82); see also DON PERETZ, Ir, iFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING (1990) (dis-
cussing Palestinian uprising).
15. YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, ISRAEL'S FATEFUL HOUR 1 (1988). "[T]he Arab-Israeli
conflict is the dominant issue of Israeli life. It casts its shadow on almost all our activi-
ties-our politics, social relations, economic development, and military deployment. As
such, it determines our present and our future - as individuals and as a nation." Id.
16. Leslie Susser, Is Peace Beyond His Reach?, JERUSALEM REP., Apr. 4, 1996, at 14.
Commencing on February 25, 1996, Islamic militant terrorists launched four suicide
bomb attacks in Israel, murdering over sixty people in only nine days. Id.
17. Ruth Gavison, The Controversy overIsrael's Bill of Rights, 15 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS.
113 (1985). Israel lacks both a written constitution and an entrenched bill of rights. Id.
Recent efforts to extend legislative protection to civil rights in Israel have escalated. See
generally Amos Shapira, A Proposalfor Constitutional Judicial Review in Israel, II TEL Aviv U.
STUD. L. 123 (1992) (discussing Tel Aviv University professors' draft of constitution for
Israel); David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli
Constitutional Law?, 26 ISR. L. REv. 238 (1992) (discussing first Basic Laws enacted which
address human rights).
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL
Public debate regarding the role thatJudaism should play in
the State of Israel began even before its establishment. 8 With
the establishment of the State, the debate intensified, as its foun-
ders were forced to transform competing ideologies into a na-
tional policy on religion-state relations.1 9 Rather than formulat-
ing a clear policy through a constitution or a bill of rights, the
Knesset adopted compromises that permitted it to avoid enact-
ing constitutionally binding laws on religion-state issues.2 0 Forty-
eight years later, Jewish Israelis remain divided over how to effec-
tively balance Israel's Jewish and democratic character.y
This Note argues that religion and state cannot be sepa-
rated in Israel. Part I presents the historical connection between
the Jewish nation and the land of Israel and its impact on Israel's
legal system. Part I also examines the current legal status of Jew-
ish law in Israel. Part II discusses proposed models for resolving
the religion-state conflict in Israel. Part III defends the integra-
tion of Jewish law into Israeli law, arguing that incorporating
only the national and cultural elements of Judaism into Israeli
policy, while ignoring its religious components, is insufficient to
sustain the notion of Israel as a Jewish state.
I. AN HISTORICAL A CCOUNT OF THE NATION OF ISRAEL
AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL
The nation of Israel and the land of Israel are inseparably
connected. 22 Israel's Declaration of Independence, '23 recogniz-
18. FEIN, supra note 9, at 16. Many of Israel's political institutions, including its
electoral system of proportional representation, trace their roots to the severe factional-
ism of the Zionist movement. Id.
19. Bernard Susser, Toward a Constitution for Israel, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 939, 940
(1993). In Israel, the dilemma of religion and state impeded the establishment of a
Constitution. Id.
20. See Harari Resolution, 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950) (Isr.) (outlining com-
promise postponing enactment of constitution).
21. NADAV SArtRAN, ISRAEL: THE EMBATrLED ALLY 200 (1981). A minority of Israelis
seek to establish a theocracy in Israel where the State would be governed solely by Jew-
ish law. Id. At the other extreme, a minority of Israelis argue for complete separation
of religion and state. Id. The majority of Israeli citizens fall somewhere in the middle
and seek to balance Jewish and democratic values. Id.
22. ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV: LESSONS OF JEWISH THOUGHT
120 (1979). Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik writes that:
Only in this land, our sages say, does the Shekinah [Divine Presence] dwell
and only therein does prophecy flourish. This singular attribute of the land is
no more rationally explicable than the singularity of the people. These are
1996] 2123
2124 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:2120
ing this connection, begins by proclaiming Eretz Israel 24 as the
birthplace of the Jewish people and tracing Jewish struggle
throughout history to reestablish the nation in its ancient home-
land. 25  The Knesset has incorporated Jewish law into its legal
system, adding a new dimension to the historical link between
the Jewish nation and its ancient homeland, and producing
unique conflicts. 26 Although Israel has incorporated Jewish law
as part of its system of governance, Israel is not a theocracy.27
Rather, religion and state interact, propelling conflicts that chal-
lenge both Israel's Jewish and democratic character. 8
A. Historical Connection Between Judaism And The Land Of Israel
God created the nation of Israel through his covenant with
Abraham and assigned to it the land of Israel. 29 The Jews
reigned in Israel, with only minor periods of interruption,3"
the qualities certified by our faith, and history has corroborated the singularity
of both people and the land.
Id.
23. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948) (Isr.).
24. SMITH, supra note 14, at 1. In Hebrew, Eretz Israel is translated as the Land of
Israel and is a termJews have used, throughout the ages, to refer to the land that their
God assigned to them in the Bible. Id.
25. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3, 4 (Isr.).
26. See CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
ISRAEL 15-28 (1984) (discussing religious symbols, institutions, and legislation sup-
ported by Israeli Government); Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce)
Law, art. 2, 7 L.S.I. 139, 139 (1953) (Isr.). "Marriages and divorces of Jews shall be
performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law." Id.
27. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.) (guaranteeing social and political equality to
all citizens regardless of religion, race, or sex).
28. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 28, 29.
29. Genesis 12:1-7. "Now the Lord said to Avram, Get thee out of thy country, and
from thy kindred and from thy father's house, to the land that I will show thee: and I
will make thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great .... And
the Lord appeared to Avram and said, To thy seed I will give this Land." Id.
30. H. Tadmor, The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration,
in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 157 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976) [hereinafter
Tadmor]. In 586 B.C.E. (before the Common Era), the First Temple was destroyed and
the Jews were exiled. Id. In 538 B.C.E., almost 70 years later, King Cyrus of Persia
granted the Jews permission to return to their land and to rebuild their Temple. Id. at
166. The Book of Ezra recounts Cyrus's edict:
Thus says Cyrus king of Persia, The Lord God of heaven has given me all the
kingdoms of the earth; and he has charged me to build Him a house atJerusa-
lem, which is injudah. Whoever is among you of all His people, let his God be
with him and let him go to Jerusalem which is injudah, and build the house
of the Lord God of Israel.
Ezra 1:2-3.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL
from approximately 1030 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.31 The Jews were de-
feated by the Romans in 70 C.E.32 and dispersed throughout the
Roman Empire.33 Throughout their long period of exile, Jews
were subject to severe persecution.3 4 At the close of the nine-
teenth century, Jewish longing to return to Israel was trans-
formed into a political movement, Zionism.3 5 The Zionist move-
ment, realizing its goal, established the State of Israel in 1948.36
1. Judaism in Antiquity
That the Jewish state was established in the region now
called Israel is not an historical accident, as the nation of Israel
and the land of Israel are inexorably linked.3 7 The nation of
Israel, unlike other nations, did not form itself.8 God called the
nation of Israel into being through his covenant with Abraham,
commanding Abraham to travel to the land of Israel, promising
that he would make Abraham's descendants a great nation and
that Abraham's descendants would inherit the land of Israel. 9
Approximately 400 years later, God covenanted with Abraham's
descendants at Mount Sinai and, through Moses, delivered the
Torah' to the nation of Israel.41 The Torah is more than a his-
torical account of the nation of Israel or a book of civil and reli-
31. See Tadmor, supra note 30, at 91-182 (surveying Jewish rule in Israel during
First Temple period, Babylonian exile, and Temple restoration); M. Stern, The Period of
the Second Temple, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 185, 185-303 (H.H. Ben-Sasson
ed., 1976) [hereinafter Stern] (surveying Jewish rule in Israel during Second Temple
period).
32. Stem, supra note 31, at 303.
33. S. Sifrai, The Era of the Mishna and the Talmud, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH
PEOPLE 307, 307 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976) [hereinafter Sifrail.
34. See H.H. Ben-Sasson, The Middle Ages, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 355,
403 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976) [hereinafter Ben-Sasson] (discussing persecution of
Jews in Middle Ages); PAUL MENDES-FLOHR &JEHUDA REINHARZ, THE JEW IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 252-99 (1980) (discussing political and racial anti-Semitism in modem pe-
riod); See id. at 484-523 (discussing Holocaust).
35. FEIN, supra note 9, at 12.
36. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948) (Isr.) (proclaiming establishment of State of
Israel).
37. See BESDIN, supra note 22, at 120 (discussing connection between land of Israel
and Jewish nation).
38. See Genesis 12:1-7, supra note 29 (discussing God's covenant with Abraham).
39. Id.
40. Torah, in THE JERUSALEM BIBLE 1-255 (Harold Fisch ed., 1982). The Torah is
the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament. Id.
41. Exodus 34:27-35
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gious laws.42 The Torah details a way of life for the Jewish na-
tion, encompassing ethical teachings not merely for the individ-
ual Jew, but forJewish society.43 Adherence to God's covenant is
considered the Jewish nation's reason for existence, without the
covenant, Jewish existence is a mere delusion.'
The Jews reigned in Israel from approximately 1030 B.C.E.
until the Babylonians exiled the Jews and destroyed their First
Temple in 586 B.C.E.45 Cyrus, King of Persia, permitted the
Jews to return to Israel and rebuild their Temple.46 Although
Cyrus did not grant the Jews complete independence, he permit-
ted the Jewish community to govern with Jewish law.47 In 70
C.E., after the Romans defeated the Jews and destroyed the Sec-
ond Temple,48 the Jews were dispersed throughout the Roman
Empire.49 During the 1813 years of Jewish exile, Jews never
ceased to long for their return to Israel.5"
2. Jewish Exile in the Middle Ages
Jews expressed their attachment to the land of Israel
through religious and social customs.51 For example, the ninth
42. Arthur Koestler, A Valedictory Message to the Jewish People, reprinted in
MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 243-45.
The Jewish religion is not merely a system of faith and worship, but implies
membership of a definite race and potential nation .... To be a good Catho-
lic or Protestant it is enough to accept certain doctrines and moral values
which transcend frontiers and nations; to be a good Jew one must profess to
belong to a chosen race, which was promised Canaan, suffered various exiles
and will return one day to its true home.
Id. at 244.
43. Id.;JOSEPH BADI, RELIGION IN ISRAEL TODAY- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE
AND RELIGION 13 (1959).
44. Id. at 14; Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Linking Life With God, in ABRAHAM ISAAC
KooK: THE LIGHTS OF PENITENCE, THE MORAL PRINCIPLES, LIGHTS OF HOLINESS, ESSAYS,
LETTERS, AND POEMS 156, 156 (Ben Zion Bosker ed., 1978). "We must attach ourselves
to the divine ideals and we must always strive to realize them in life, in thought, in
action and in the imagination, in life of the individual and of society, in our deepest
and most zealous aspirations. Id.
45. Tadmor, supra note 30, at 157.
46. Id. at 166.
47. See id. at 166-71 (discussing Jewish return under Cyrus).
48. Sifrai, supra note 33, at 303.
49. Id. at 307.
50. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3 (Isr.) "After being forcibly exiled from their land, the
people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and
hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom." Id.
51. AHARON COHEN, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 25 (1970).
1996] FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL 2127
day of the month of Av was declared an official Jewish day of
mourning, commemorating the destruction of the Temple.5"
Daily prayers resounded with the longing to return to Jerusa-
lem.5" Jewish attachment to Israel was also expressed by a con-
stant trickle of Jewish immigration, often in the face of extreme
danger. 4 Jewish return was propelled by religious motivations
and the Jews who settled in Israel during the Middle Ages estab-
lished religious communities and centers of Jewish learning.5
3. Jewish Communities in Europe
In Europe, Jews lived under foreign rule and were subjected
to anti-Semitism5 6 expulsion, and often death at the hands of
those in power. 57 During their exile, Jews developed distinct
streams of thought regarding their individual connections to the
Jewish nation and to the land of Israel.58 The contrasting polit-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In 1211, 300 Rabbis and scholars from France and England settled in Pales-
tine and established synagogues. Id. In 1267, Nachmanides (Ramban), the greatest
religious authority of the age, migrated from Spain to Jerusalem with a community of
followers. Id. at 25, 26. In the thirteenth century, several groups of Jews moved to
Palestine from Germany. Id. After Spain expelled the Jews in 1492, many Jews mi-
grated to Palestine. Id. During the sixteenth century, Jewish Kabbalists migrated to
Palestine and established a center of Kabbalist thought in Safed. Id. Throughout the
eighteenth century, Jews migrated to Palestine in larger numbers and began to rebuild
cities and found Jewish communities. Id.
55. Yossi BEILIN, ISRAEL: A CONCISE POLTCAL HISTORY 13 (1992). Jews lived
mainly in Jerusalem and other holy cities and concentrated solely on religious worship
and study. Id. They were supported by contributions from wealthy Jews living in the
diaspora and were not concerned with establishing a Jewish communal framework. Id.
56. WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDCED DICTIONARY 83 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 1983)
Anti-Semitism is defined as, "[p]rejudice against the Jews; dislike or fear of Jews and
Jewish things." Id. Letter from Adolf Hitler to Adolf Gemlich (Sept. 16, 1919), trans-
lated in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 484. Hitler wrote that:
Anti-Semitism as a political movement cannot and should not be determined
by emotional factors, but rather by the facts .... Hence, it follows: Anti-
Semitism based purely on emotional grounds will find its ultimate expressions
in the form of pogroms. Rational anti-Semitism, however, must pursue a sys-
tematic, legal campaign against the Jews, by the revocation of the special privi-
leges they enjoy in contrast to the other foreigners living among us. But the
final objective must be the complete removal of the Jews.
Id.
57. See S. Ettinger, The Modern Period, in A HISTORY OF THEJEWISH PEOPLE 727, 730-
32, 870-90 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976) [hereinafter Ettinger] (discussing anti-Semi-
tism in Europe).
58. Id. at 805. In Western and Central Europe, Jewish equality was contingent
upon their rejection ofJewish customs. Id. Jews seeking emancipation renounced per-
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ical and social experiences of Jews in Western and Eastern Eu-
rope shaped Jews' relationships to their religion and tradition
and propelled conflicting views on Jewish return to Israel.59
Western European Jews fought for emancipation arguing
that they should be nationalized because they could contribute
valuably to society,60 not because they possessed intrinsic rights
as human beings.6" In their fight for emancipation, Western Eu-
ropean Jews sought to relinquish their ties to Israel.62 They
hoped to gain societal acceptance by proving that they were not
a separate nation, with divided loyalties, dwelling within the
larger nation.63 In Western Europe, Jews sought to integrate
into mainstream society by distinguishing individual member-
ship in the Jewish religion from the idea that the Jews consti-
tuted a nation, were loyal to that nation and would prefer to
consolidate and reestablish themselves in Israel.64
The promise of Jewish emancipation throughout Western
Europe stimulated Jewish assimilation.65 Many countries re-
quired assimilation as a pre-requisite to nationalization.66 Jews
sonal ties to the land of Israel. Id. In Eastern Europe, Jews were severely persecuted
and sustained strong religious and communal bonds. SMiTH, supra note 14, at 27.
59. See Ettinger, supra note 57, at 777-89 (discussingJewish communities in West-
ern and Central Europe); see id. at 813-24 (discussing Jewish communities in Eastern
Europe).
60. MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 7. The emergence in Western
Europe of the centralized state, from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, facilitated
the development of mercantilism or' early capitalism. Id. At this time, Jews in Europe
had no political power and, therefore, were not perceived as a threat by rulers. Id.
Rather, they possessed requisite skills to assist rulers in developing national treasuries
and economies. Id. Jews introduced a novel criterion for determining the legal status
of the Jew in Europe, suggesting that they should be nationalized because of their util-
ity. Id.
61. Id. at 8.
62. John Toland, Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland, re-
printed in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 12.
Another consideration that makes the Jews preferable to several sorts of Peo-
ple, is, their having no Country of their own, to which they might retire, after
having got Estates here; or in favor of which, they might trade under the um-
brage of our naturalization .... [blut the Jews having no such Country, to
which they are ty'd by inclination or interest as their own, will never likewise
enter into any political engagements, which might be prejudicial to ours.
Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 807.
66. See, e.g., The French National Assembly, Debate on the Eligibility of Jews for
Citizenship, translated in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 103 (stating that
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seeking emancipation attempted to rid Judaism of traditional
laws that set them apart, thereby preventing them from integrat-
ing into the non-Jewish world." The first comprehensive reform
to Judaism was instituted in Hamburg, Germany in 1817:68 an-
cient Hebrew prayers were translated to German, the synagogue
service adopted church-like qualities, including organ music that
desecrated the Sabbath, and all prayers mentioning the Mes-
siah69 and Jewish longing to be redeemed from exile and re-
stored to their homeland were omitted.70 Jewish reform was met
with widespread opposition from Orthodox Jewish communities
throughout Europe.71
At the same time that Western European countries were na-
tionalizing their Jews, Eastern European countries embarked on
to acquire citizenship, Jews must relinquish national distinctiveness and judicial auton-
omy); Joseph II, Edict of Tolerance, translated in MENDES-FLOHR & RENHARZ, supra note
34, at 34 (declaring that Jews could be useful to State by sending their children to
Christian schools); Ettinger, supra note 57, at 805 (discussing Hungary's policy denying
Jews equal rights while they observed customs setting them apart from their surround-
ings).
67. MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 141. See ROBERT M. SELTZER,
JEWISH PEOPLE, JEWISH THOUGHT: THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN HISTORY 580-618 (1980)
(discussing Jewish religious reform).
68. The New Israelite Temple Association, Constitution of the Hamburg Temple,
reprinted in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 145.
69. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1130 (Jean L. McKechine
ed., 1983). Messiah is defined as, "in Judaism, the promised and expected deliverer of
the Jews." Id.
One ofJudaism's fondest hopes and most fervent prayers is for the coming of
the messiah. The messianic age is humankind's ultimate goal and reward-the
time when there will be eternal reward for anyone who has ever lived, and
when all the ills and evils that beset the world will be gone, replaced by com-
plete peace and perfection.
RABBI WAYNE DOSICK, LIVING JUDAISM: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO JEWISH BELIEF, TRADI-
TION, AND PRACTICE 43 (1995). Jewish tradition affirms that the messiah will be a de-
scendant of King David, gain sovereignty over the land of Israel, gather the entire Jew-
ish nation in Israel, restore complete observance of the Torah, and bring peace to the
world. RABBI JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY- THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO
KNOW ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE AND ITS HISTORY 545 (1991).
70. MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 142.
71. See The Hamburg Rabbinical Court, These are the Words of the Covenant,
translated in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 150 (stating that learned men
in Germany, Poland, France, Italy, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary join to abolish re-
forms instituted by ignorant individuals unversed in Torah and to reaffirm necessity of
Jewish law and Israel); Moses Sofer, A Reply Concerning the Question of Reform, trans-
lated in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 153 (discussing central role of
Jewish law to Jewish survival and condemning reformers.)
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a century-long phase ofJewish oppression and forced isolation.72
Russian authorities forced Jews to live in designated areas7" and
prohibited Jews from participating in Russian society.7 4 The iso-
lation and concentration of Eastern European Jewry, however,
facilitated the continuity of strong religious and communal
bonds.75 Jews remained committed to Israel and yearned for the
day when allJews could return to their ancient homeland.76 The
earliest stirrings of Zionism 77 were championed mainly by reli-
gious Jews from Eastern Europe 78 who were concerned with ad-
herence to Jewish law, particularly the Jewish duty to settle in
Israel. 9
4. The Pre-State Period
During the century preceding the establishment of the State
of Israel, Jews espoused distinct ideas regarding Jewish return to
the land of Israel and the goals of the Zionist movement.80 They
were united, however, by their rejection ofJewish exile and their
common goal of establishing a safe haven for Jews from persecu-
tion.81 Jews emigrated to Palestine and lived under Ottoman,8 2
72. SMITH, supra note 14, at 27.
73. Id. In 1790 and 1791, Russia passed laws creating the Pale of Settlement, stipu-
lating that Jews were confined to living in former Polish territories and other areas of
Southwest Russia. Id.
74. Id. Jews were only permitted to integrate into Russian society if they converted
to Christianity. Id.
75. Id. See W.F. ABBOUSHI, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 212 (1970) (stating that since Jews were exiled from Israel in approximately 63
C.E., they dreamed of returning to what they believed was their promised land).
76. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3 (Isr.) (discussing Jewish longing to return to
Israel).
77. Theodor Herzl, A Solution of the Jewish Question, reprinted in MENDES-FLOHR &
REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 422-26. Herzl defined Zionism by stating that:
I am introducing no new idea; on the contrary, it is a very old one. It is a
universal idea - and therein lies its power - old as the people, which never,
even in the time of bitterest calamity, ceased to cherish it. This is the restora-
tion of the Jewish State.
Id. at 422.
78. ARTHUR HERTZBERG, THE ZIONIST IDEA 32, 33 (1972). The first theoreticians of
Zionism appeared in the 1850's and 1860's. Id. at 32. At the time, their work had little
influence and was quickly forgotten. Id. Zionism reemerged in the 1880's and 1890's.
Id. at 33.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Ettinger, supra note 57, at 891-938 (discussing contrasting Zionist ide-
ologies); HARALi, supra note 15, at 70-83 (contrasting Mainstream and Revisionist Zi-
onism); SAFRAN, supra note 21, at 14-23 (discussing Zionist movement).
. 81. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEwS 375 (1987).
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and then British rule,8 3 until they established the Jewish State.84
a. Zionist Ideologies
At the close of the nineteenth century, against the back-
ground of both Jewish persecution and acceptance, Zionism was
transformed from a formless longing to return to Israel into a
political movement."5 The Zionist movement was factional-
ized,8 6 as Zionists debated which political strategies would hasten
autonomy, whether political independence should be the move-
ment's primary goal, whether physical settlement should be ele-
vated over political negotiations, and if independence was at-
tained, whether Jewish law should serve as the country's founda-
tion." Despite internal disagreements, Zionists encouraged all
Jews to emigrate to Israel, regardless of their individual beliefs. 8
Approximately 385,000 Jews emigrated to Israel, in five waves,
from 1881-1939.9 Each wave of immigration, Aliya,90 was pro-
82. See SMITH, supra note 14, at 11-37 (discussing Ottoman rule in Palestine from
1517-1914).
83. See id. at 42-135 (discussing British Mandate in Palestine from 1914-48).
84. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948) (Isr.) (establishing State of Israel).
85. FEIN, supra note 9, at 12.
86. See Ettinger, supra note 57, at 891-938 (discussing Zionist ideologies); see supra
note 80 and accompanying text (discussing competing Zionist ideologies and goals).
87. FEIN, supra note 9, at 14.
88. See SAIRAN, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing Zionists' task of encouragingJewish
immigration to Israel).
89. SMITH, supra note 14, at 28. From 1881 until 1884, the first series of attacks, or
pogroms, were waged against the Jews of Russia. Id. Peasant groups, tolerated and
even encouraged by Russian authorities, pillaged Jewish communities, looting, raping,
and killingJews. Id. The pogroms shattered any remaining hope ofJewish acceptance
in Russia and propelled the first Aliya, a vast emigration movement of approximately
40,000Jews to Palestine. Id. Jewish immigrants of the first Aliya were inspired primarily
by religious motives. Id.
FEIN, supra note 9, at 17-18. During the second Aliya, between 1904 and 1913,
approximately 40,000Jews emigrated to Palestine. Id. at 17; Ettinger, supra note 57, at
921. The second Aliya was also comprised of Russian Jews, however, their motivations
were not purely religious. FEIN, supra note 9, at 17. Rather, they had been influenced
by socialist ideologies and viewed themselves as heralds of a new socialist order. Id.;
Ettinger, supra note 57. at 921.
Thirty-five thousand Jews emigrated to Palestine during the third Aliya between
1919 and 1922. FEIN, supra note 9, at 18. The third Aliya was also comprised mainly of
Russian Jews. Id. These Jews, however, had strong roots in the Zionist movement
before they arrived in Palestine and were better prepared than the Jews of the first and
second Aliyot (plural of Aliya) to cope with the harsh conditions they met upon arrival.
Id. at 19. They opened schools and universities, founded Israel's major labor union,
employed new agricultural techniques, and created institutions for communal self gov-
ernment. Id. The Jews of the third Aliya were primarily concerned with developing a
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pelled by distinct religious, social, and political forces and the
Zionists of each Aliya contributed uniquely to the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine and to the establishment of the State of
Israel.91
Theodor Herzl founded political Zionism.9 2 As an assimi-
lated, secular Frenchman, he originally advocated Jewish eman-
cipation as the solution to anti-Semitism and Jewish persecu-
tion.93  After witnessing the persistence of anti-Semitism in
France, the birthplace of liberalism and Jewish emancipation,
Herzl sought to employ a new vehicle to end Jewish suffering.
94
He rejected political assimilation and argued that only Jewish
sovereignty could ensure freedom for the Jewish nation.95 For
new social order. Id. at 20. Although they viewed political independence as necessary,
they first sought to create a self reliant community based on cooperative enterprise and
voluntarism. Id.
The fourth Aliya was comprised of 60,000 Polish, middle class immigrants. Id. at
21. The fourth Aliya was triggered by increased anti-Semitism in Poland and by a new,
more restrictive immigration policy in the United States. Id. By the end of the fourth
Aliya only 17% of Palestine's population wasJewish. Id. at 22. Zionists were concerned
and hoped to stimulate an increase in Jewish immigration. Id.
Zionists' concerns were quieted by the 225,000Jews that returned to Palestine dur-
ing the fifth Aliya between 1932 and 1939. Id. For the fist time, substantial numbers of
Jews came from Central Europe. Id. ManyJews of the fifth Aliya were professionals and
contributed widely to the existing Jewish communities. Id. By 1939, Jews comprised
30% of Palestine's population, and were a force to be reckoned with. Id. The leader-
ship of the Zionist movement had shifted to Palestine and their demand was clear: the
establishment of an independent, Jewish State in Palestine. Id.
90. FEIN, supra note 9, at 9. In the Jewish tradition, immigration to Israel is called
Aliya which literally means to go up or ascend. Id.
91. See id. at 16-22 (outlining five waves of immigration); Ettinger, supra note 57, at
918-38 (discussing implementation of Jewish institutions during waves of Aliya); supra
note 89 (discussing contributions of Zionist pioneers to Jewish community in Pales-
tine).
92. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3 (Isr.) (referring to Herzl as father of Zionism).
93. Herzl, supra note 77, at 423.
94. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 898.
95. Herzl, supra note 77, at 423. Herzl stated that:
We have honestly striven everywhere to merge ourselves in the social life of
surrounding communities, and to preserve only the faith of our fathers. It has
not been permitted to us. In vain we are loyal patriots, in some places our
loyalty running to extremes; in vain do we make the same sacrifices of life and
property as our fellow-citizens; in vain do we strive to increase the fame of our
native land in science and art, or her wealth by trade and commerce. In coun-
tries where we have lived for centuries we are still cried down as strangers ....
We are one people - our enemies have made us one in our despite, as repeat-
edly happens in history. Distress binds us together, and thus united, we sud-
denly discover our strength. Yes, we are strong enough to form a state and a
model state.
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Herzl, the primary goal of the Zionist movement was to establish
a Jewish state.96
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, leader of religious Zionism, 97
argued that the land of Israel was an integral part of the soul of
the Jewish people.98 Rabbi Kook rejected the notion thatJewish
return to Israel should be encouraged on purely nationalistic
grounds.99 He viewed the Zionist movement as a vehicle to pro-
mote adherence to the Torah."°° By aligning the religious com-
munity with the Zionists, Rabbi Kook believed that Torah could
be infused into the Zionist movement. 1 ' Religious Zionists
worked with secular Zionists before the State of Israel was estab-
lished and continued to serve as their partner in government
after a Jewish state had been secured."0 2
Ahad Ha-am, the leader of cultural Zionism, argued that the
primary goal of the nationalist movement should be to revive
Jewish spiritual unity." 3 Ahad Ha-am believed that preserving
Judaism was the only means of strengthening the Jewish nation
and political attempts to establish a state should be subordinated
Id.
96. NOAH LucAs, THE MODERN HISTORY OF ISRAEL 71 (1975).
97. Rabbi Zadok Ha-Cohen Rabinowitz, The Zionists are not our Saviors, translated
in MENDES-FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 432-34. Many religious Jews opposed
Zionism, claiming that only God could redeem the Jewish nation and return them to
Israel. Id. Rabbi Zadok Ha-Cohen argued that Zionist creation of a state, modeled
after other states, demeans the Torah and will propel the Jewish nation's destruction.
Id.
98. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, The Land of Israel, translated in HERTZBERG, supra
note 78, at 419. Ray Kook stated that:
Eretz Israel is not something apart from the soul of the Jewish people; it is no
mere national possession, serving as a means of unifying our people and but-
tressing its material, or even spiritual, survival. Eretz Israel is part of the very
essence of our nationhood; it is bound organically to its very life and inner
being.
Id.
99. Id.
100. JOHNSON, supra note 81, at 547, 548.
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id.
103. LucAs, supra note 96, at 27. Ahad Ha-am wrote, "We must liberate ourselves
from the inner slavery, from the degradation of the spirit caused by assimilation, and we
must strengthen our national unity until we become capable and worthy of a future life
of honor and freedom. All other aims are still part of ideas and fantasies." Ahad Ha-
am, The First Zionist Congress, translated in MENDEs-FLOHR & REINHARz, supra note 34, at
430. See generally SELEcrED ESSAYS OF AHaD HA-AM (Leon Simon ed., 1962) (discussing
Ahad Ha-am's approach to theoretical and practical problems of Jewish people).
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to the task of creating a spiritual center of Judaism in Israel. 10 4
Insisting that Jewish survival was contingent upon reversing as-
similation, Ahad Ha-am fought vehemently against separating
the national and religious elements of Judaism.10 5
Mainstream Zionism mandated that before the Jews could
establish a political state in Israel, they had to first build a strong
Jewish community and solid economic and social foundations
for a Jewish state."0 6 Mainstream Zionists sought to create Jew-
ish agrarian and working classes who would labor together to
build the Jewish homeland." 7 They viewed the establishment of
statehood as a long process of struggle to build Jewish national
assets in Israel. 08
Vladimir Jabotinsky, leader of the Revisionist Zionist move-
ment, 0 9 argued that to overcome exile and its negative effects
on the Jewish nation, Jews must establish a state immediately."'
Revisionist Zionists claimed that Jews needed to be imbued with
the fighting spirit and to reclaim the land that was rightfully
theirs." 1 They argued that establishing a state was a pre-requi-
site to developing economic and social foundations and advo-
cated the use of force as a means of gaining control.' 12 Jabotin-
sky argued that mainstream Zionists were dreamers, lacking the
revolutionary thrust that was necessary to establish a state.1 3
b. The Jewish Community in Pre-State Palestine
Unlike their predecessors," 4 the Zionists who emigrated to
Palestine during the five Aliyot created a communal framework
104. See Ahad Ha-am, supra note 103, at 430-32 (discussing subordination of polit-
ical objectives to revival of Jewish spiritual unity).
105. Ahad Ha-am, On Nationalism and Religion, translated in HERTZBERG, supra
note 78, at 262. "'National Religion' - by all means: Judaism is fundamentally na-
tional, and all the efforts of the 'Reformers' to separate the Jewish religion from its
national element have had no result except to ruin both the nationalism and the reli-
gion." Id.
106. HARKAti, supra note 15, at 71.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 70.
110. Vladimir Jabotinsky, What the Zionists-Rvisionsists Want, translated in MENDES-
FLOHR & REINHARZ, supra note 34, at 462-65. "The first aim of the Zionist movement is
establishing a majority on both sides of the Jordan River." Id. at 462.
111. H.stxa~i, supra note 15, at 72.
112. Id.
113. LucAs, supra note 96, at 73, 74.
114. BEILIN, supra note 55, at 13. EarlyJewish immigrants were concerned solely
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for the growing Jewish community.1" Under Ottoman rule,
from 1517 to 1914,116 religious minorities, including the Jewish
community, were granted judicial autonomy in matters of per-
sonal status including: marriage, divorce, family maintenance,
and education. 1 7 This system, termed the millet system, granted
religious minorities living within the Ottoman empire the free-
dom to safeguard their individual religious laws. l" 8 The Jews of
the first two Aliyot, who emigrated to Ottoman controlled Pales-
tine, established religious courts that strictly applied Jewish
law. 19  After the First World War, the British Government
gained control of what was then Palestine under the mandatory
scheme enacted by the League of Nations. 2 ' The British pre-
served the millet system in Palestine and religious authorities
continued their governance over matters of the personal status
of their adherents.12
1
The Jews of the third, fourth, and fifth Aliyot arrived in Brit-
ish controlled Palestine between 1919 and 1939 and were met
with hostility from the Arab population. 2 2 With the increase in
Jewish immigration, Jewish-Arab tension mounted and clashes
broke out between the two communities.12 3 In 1917, the British
government issued the Balfour Declaration1 24 supporting the es-
with religious observance, not with building political and social foundations for ajewish
state. Id.
115. See id. at 16-36 (discussing Zionists' political, social, and agricultural enter-
prises in pre-state Palestine).
116. See SMITH, supra note 14, at 11-37 (discussing Ottoman rule in Palestine).
117. Itzhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 Am.J. CoMP. L. 185, 196 (1984).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22 (outlining mandatory scheme). See
also Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine confirmed by the Council of the League
of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007-12 (1922) (outlining terms of British Mandate
over Palestine).
121. The Palestine Order in Council (1922-1947), Paragraph 83, III Laws of Pales-
tine 2569 (1934). The Palestine Order in Council states that:
All persons in Palestine shall enjoy full liberty of conscience and the free exer-
cise of their forms of worship subject only to the maintenance of public order
and morals. Each religious community shall enjoy autonomy for the internal
affairs of the community subject to the provisions of any ordinance or order
issued by the High Commissioner.
Id.
122. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 997.
123. Id.
124. The Balfour Declaration (1917), reprinted in RUTH LAPIDOTH & MOSHE
HIRSCH, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 20
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tablishment of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. 125 British
statesmen were deeply sympathetic to the Zionist cause because
they possessed religious, Christian interests in the land of the
Old Testament and were burdened with guilt over Europe's
treatment of the Jews.126 The Balfour Declaration sparked in-
creased Arab hostility toward the Jewish community127 and the
intermittent riots continued.1 2 8
The British Government appointed a commission to investi-
gate the causes of the riots and to propose policies to ease Jew-
ish-Arab tensions. 12 9 The Shaw report, published in 1930, identi-
fied Zionist immigration and their purchasing of Arab lands as
the source of the riots. 1 3  The British responded by issuing a
series of White Papers, limiting Jewish immigration.'
World War II had begun and the British sought to resolve
the crises in Palestine in a manner favorable to the Arabs, in the
hopes of fostering Arab support for continued British rule of
Palestine. 3 2 The British entered World War II with the knowl-
edge that their policies had not only failed to resolve Jewish-Arab
tension in Palestine, but also had failed to secure the support of
either community for continued British rule. 3 British reversal
of their favorable policy towards the Zionists, through the issu-
ance of the White Papers, failed to satisfy the Arabs and out-
raged the Zionists.1 3 4
(1992). The Balfour Declaration is a letter written by British Lord ArthurJames Balfour
addressed to Lord Walter Rothschild, then honorary president of the Zionist Federa-
tion of Great Britain and Ireland, declaring that, "His Majesty's government view with
favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People, and will
use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object." Id.
125. Id.
126. SMITH, supra note 14, at 55.
127. Id.
128. SMITH, supra note 14, at 87, 88. Major riots, for example, broke out between
Arabs and Jews in 1928 and 1929 over access to the Western Wall. Id. The Western
Wall is the last remnant of the Second Temple, the holiestJewish site to Jews and a focal
point of religious and national pride. Id. According to the Muslim belief, the area
behind the Wall is the third-holiest site, where the Prophet Muhammad ascended to
heaven. Id. The Wall itself is considered holy because Muhammad tethered his horse
to it before his ascent. Id.
129. Id. at 90.
130. Id. See SAFrA,, supra note 21, at 29 (indicating Arab hostilities were propelled
by increase in Jewish immigration).
131. SMITH, supra note 14, at 92.
132. Id. at 103.
133. Id. at 108.
134. Id.
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In 1941 Adolf Hitler implemented his plan to exterminate
the Jewish race.1 35 As the massive slaughtering ofJews coincided
with British restrictive immigration policies, Zionist leaders facili-
tated the illegal immigration of thousands of Jews into Pales-
tine. 13 British officials interceded and attempted to transfer il-
legal refugees to the island of Mauitius in the Indian Ocean.
3 7
Jews became increasingly bitter at Great Britain's inhumane poli-
cies and began to attack British installations.1
3
5. The Establishment of the State of Israel
By the conclusion of World War II, Hitler had succeeded in
exterminating two thirds of Europe'sJewish population, approx-
imately six million Jews.1 39 Conflicts between the Jews and the
British over Jewish immigration continued as did conflicts be-
tween the Jews and the Arabs and the Arabs and the British. 0
In February of 1947, the British thrust the Palestine problem
into the hands of the United Nations,' 4 ' openly denouncing the
Jewish call for statehood. 4 '
In June 1947, the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine
("UNSCOP") convened in Jerusalem to discuss recommenda-
tions regarding Palestine. 43 The Zionists, interested in present-
ing a unified front, wanted to prevent a situation where repre-
sentatives of Jewish Orthodoxy would openly express opposition
to the establishment of ajewish state.'" On the eve of the Com-
mission's arrival, the Zionists consolidated and passed the Status
Quo Agreement, a series of four promises assuring the religious
leadership that the principal arrangements regarding religious-
state issues that existed prior to independence would be main-
135. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 1025, 1027.
136. Id. at 1048, 1049.
137. SMITH, supra note 14, at 115.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 112.
140. See Ettinger, supra note 57, at 1011-14 (discussing Arab revolt againstJews and
English); Id. at 1044 (discussing Jewish terrorism against British).
141. Id. at 1052. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced that because
the British were unable to resolve the conflicts between the Jewish and Arab popula-
tions in Palestine, they decided to refer the problem to the United Nations. Id.; see
SAFRAN, supra note 21, at 31 (stating that British deferred Palestine problem to United
Nations on April 2, 1947, after failure of Arab-Jewish-British conference).
142. SMITH, supra note 14, at 135.
143. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 1052.
144. S-A ,rMN, supra note 7, at 70.
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tained if the Jews secured an independent state.145 Ultimately,
the Knesset absorbed British Mandatory legislation regarding
personal status into Israeli law."4
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations adopted the
Partition Resolution, 14 7 dividing Palestine into two independent
states, Jewish and Arab respectively." 8 The Zionists accepted the
Partition Resolution.1 49  The Arabs, however, rejected parti-
tion, 150 refusing to recognize the United Nations' legitimacy in
deciding the fate of Palestine. 5 ' Arab-Jewish clashes increased
and six months later, on May 14, 1948, Ben Gurion, Israel's first
Prime Minister, proclaimed the establishment of a Jewish
state. 152 The next day, five Arab countries simultaneously in-
vaded Israel.'5 3
The State of Israel was established through the labor of all
Zionists, regardless of the ideologies propelling their respective
struggles.15 4  The realization of their collective goal, however,
did not resolve the movement's internal conflicts over religion-
state issues.' 5 In fact, the establishment of ajewish state height-
ened their differences as they were faced with the immediate
145. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 32. The Status Quo Agreement pro-
vided that:
(1) Saturday would be set aside as a national day of rest, (2) dietary laws (Kash-
rut) would be observed in all kitchens under government auspices, (3) reli-
gious courts would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce
laws and (4) the existing autonomous religious educational systems would be
recognized by the future state.
Id.
146. The Law and Administration Ordinance art. 11, 1 L.S.I. 7, 9 (1948) (Isr.).
147. On the Future Government of Palestine [the "Partition Resolution"], GA Res. 133,
U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131-51 (1947).
148. Id.
149. The Acceptance of the Above Resolution &y the Representatives of the Jewish Community
in Palestine, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Ad hoc Comm. on Palestine Question, U.N. Doc. A/
364, at 12-19 (1947).
150. The Rejection of the Above Resolution y the Arab States and the Higher Arab Commit-
tee, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Ad hoc Comm. on Palestine Question, U.N. Doc. A/364, at 5-
11 (1947).
151. Id.
152. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948) (Isr.).
153. Ettinger, supra note 57, at 1058.
154. See, e.g., SAGER, supra note 6, at 1-21 (discussing Zionist contributions to State
of Israel); BEILIN, supra note 55, at 16-36 (discussing Zionist enterprises in pre-state
Palestine); FEIN, supra note 9, at 15-16 (stating that Israel owes not only its establish-
ment, but also foundation of many of its institutions to Zionist Organization).
155. See Susser, supra note 19, at 940 (stating that differences over religion-state
issues was most critical factor impeding enactment of constitution in Israel).
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task of implementing their ideologies into a national policy."' 6
Their differing conceptions of the Jewish State impacted on Is-
raeli political development from its inception.1 57
B. Israel's Legal System
Israel's Declaration of Independence' 58 ("Declaration")
contains contradicting promises, guaranteeing that Israel will be
a Jewish state and, at the same time, that freedom of religion will
be protected.1 59 Israel lacks both a constitution and a bill of
rights dictating the status of Jewish law relative to civil rights.16 °
Rather, the State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy where
the voice of the legislature is supreme.' 61
1. The Declaration of Independence
Israel's Declaration begins by proclaiming Eretz Israel as the
birthplace of the Jewish people and tracing Jewish struggle
throughout history to reestablish the nation in Israel. 6 ' The
Declaration cites the sacrifices and the accomplishments of the
Zionist pioneers,165 the Balfour Declaration," 4 the U.N. Parti-
tion Resolution, 6 5 and the massacre of millions of Jews in Eu-
rope 66 as the moral and legal foundations of the State.'67 The
Declaration also ensures that every Jew can freely emigrate to
Israel.168
At the same time, the Declaration promises that the State
156. Id.
157. See SAGER, supra note 6, at 1-21 (discussing pre-stateJewish community's influ-
ence on political system in Israel).
158. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948) (Isr.).
159. Id. at 3, 4.
160. Baruch Bracha, The Protection of Human Rights in Israel, 12 ISR. L. Rev. 110, 111
(1982). As a result, civil rights do not enjoy normative superiority over ordinary laws
passed by the legislature. Id.
161. Id.
162. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3, 4 (Isr.).
163. Id. at 3; See supra notes 85-113 and accompanying text (discussing Zionist pio-
neers).
164. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3 (Isr.); see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text
(discussing Balfour Declaration).
165. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.); see supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text
(discussing U.N. Partition Resolution).
166. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.); see supra note 139 and accompanying text
(discussing Holocaust).
167. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3, 4 (Isr.).
168. Id. at 4.
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will be based on freedom,justice, and peace as envisioned by the
prophets of Israel and will safeguard complete equality of social
and political rights to all of its inhabitants regardless of religion,
race, or sex.1 69 The Declaration guarantees freedom of religion,
conscience, language, education, and culture. 70 Consequently,
the dual commitment to create ajewish state and to provide civil
liberties, including freedom of religion and conscience, is built
into the foundation of the State of Israel.171
2. Constitutional Question
Although the founders of the State of Israel intended the
State's political life to be governed by a constitution,' 72 Israel has
yet to enact a formal, written constitution. 171 Israel's Declaration
expressly states that the permanent and elected governmental
organs of the State would be established under a constitution to
be drafted by an elected constituent assembly.174 Although a
constituent assembly was elected, it dissolved itself before draft-
ing a constitution and transformed itself into Israel's first Knes-
set, 75 some of whose members advocated postponing the devel-
opment of a constitution.176
From the State's inception, the question of whether to
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 3, 4 (articulating conflicting guarantees in Declaration).
172. Id. at 4.
173. See Bracha, supra note 160, at 111 (stating that Israel lacks constitution). Only
seven countries in the United Nations lack a written constitution: Israel, New Zealand,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, Pou-rics, AND CUi,
TURE IN ISRAEL 133 (1994).
174. Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.). The Declaration states that, "We hereby de-
clare that as from the termination of the Mandate at midnight... and until the setting
up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be
drawn up by a Constituent assembly...." Id. The Constituent Assembly's sole task was
to adopt a constitution. SAGER, supra note 6, at 25.
175. Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance art. 3, 2 L.S.I. 81 (1949) (Isr.).
Some constitutional scholars believe that, presently, the Knesset does not have constitu-
tive powers. Gavison, supra note 17, at 118. They argue either that the Knesset's consti-
tutive powers expired with the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset or that they
elapsed after the first Knesset disbanded without enacting a constitution. Id. Others
assert that Israel's Declaration of Independence obligates the Knesset to enact a consti-
tution because the portion of the Declaration regarding the constitution was accorded
the force of law. Id.
176. Zeev Segal, A Constitution Without a Constitution: The Israeli Experience and the
American Impact, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 20 (1992).
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adopt a constitution sparked both public and internal political
debate in Israel. 177 Those that opposed the immediate drafting
of a constitution argued that a formal constitution would thwart
the development of the State. 178 Upon establishment, Israeli so-
ciety was composed of a young community awaiting the ingather-
ing of Diaspora 179 Jews.18 ° Developing a constitution before Di-
aspora Jews' arrived, critics argued, would have precluded the
State from affording the entire potential population an opportu-
nity to participate in the constitutive process. 181
The prospect of a constitution raised the additional di-
lemma of reconciling the state of emergency18 2 that Israel faced
from its inception with the protection of human rights.18 Israel
declared a state of emergency because it was surrounded by Arab
countries that had proclaimed as their main policy objective the
destruction of the Jewish State.184 A constitution would have had
to take into account security requirements necessary to cope
with hostile Arab countries and the war they immediately waged
upon the Jewish state, and invest the government and military
authorities with far-reaching emergency powers. 8 5  Because
such emergency powers would inevitably have encroached upon
individual rights, 1 6 opponents argued that adopting a constitu-
tion, while the very existence of the country was threatened,
would preclude the Knesset from fully recognizing the scope of
civil liberties that it wished to protect.1 8 7
177. Stephen Goldstein, Protection of Human Rights By Judges: The Israeli Experience,
38 ST. Louis. U. LJ. 605, 605 (1994).
178. Shapira, supra note 7, at 285.
179. WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 504 (Deluxe 2d ed. 1983). Diaspora
is defined as "the dispersion of the Jews after the Babylonian exile." Id.
180. Shapira, supra note 7, at 285. Hundreds and thousands of new immigrants
came to Israel in the 1940's and 1950's from all corners of the Earth. Id.
181. See, e.g., id. (articulating ingathering of exiles argument); Susser, supra note
19, at 940 (discussing ingathering of exiles argument).
182. Gavison, supra note 106, at 138 n.75. A state of emergency in Israel is created
by a government proclamation. Id. The Government issued such a proclamation on
May 19, 1948, and it has been in force ever since. Id.
183. Shapira, supra note 7, at 286.
184. H RiaI, supra note 15, at 2, 3. Arab States viewed the destruction of Israel,
not as merely an aspiration, but as a practical, tangible goal. Id. at 2. Arab countries
organized their societies, developed their economies, and built their military forces
around this goal of destroying Israel. Id.
185. Shapira, supra note 7, at 286.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Ultimately, the most persuasive argument advanced for de-
laying the adoption of a written constitution, however, was that
drafting a constitution would divide the nation over the un-
resolved dilemma of religion and state in Israeli society. '88
Adopting a constitution would force the Israeli Government to
take a formal position on the role that Jewish law would be af-
forded in the new State, a position that would be difficult to later
alter. '89 Profound, irreconconcilable differences in world view
between secular and Orthodox Jews existed and continue to ex-
ist and could not be solved by compromise or linguistic formula-
tions.'90 Adopting a position, either way, would have deepened
the cultural rifts in Israeli society between Orthodox and secular
Jews.1 91 Opponents of enacting a constitution argued that as the
State was in the midst of a bitter struggle for its physical survival,
the Israeli people had to remain unified and channel their ener-
gies, exclusively, to matters of national security. 192
The first Knesset accepted a compromise and adopted the
Harari Resolution on June 13, 1950.193 Rather than drafting and
adopting a constitution immediately, the Knesset, according to
this resolution, charged the Constitutional, Law and Justice
Committee with preparing a proposed constitution, piece-
meal. "'9 4 The Knesset directed the Committee to draft chapters
called "Basic Laws."' 95 Upon completion, the Basic Laws were to
be unified in one doctrine that would later serve as Israel's Con-
stitution.196
Because nothing distinguishes Basic Laws from ordinary
188. Id.; Susser, supra note 19, at 940.
189. Shapira, supra note 7, at 285.
190. Susser, supra note 19, at 940.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950) (Isr.). The Harari Resolution states that:
The first Knesset directs the Constitutional, Legislative andJudicial Com-
mittee to prepare a draft constitution for the State. The Constitution shall be
composed of separate chapters so that each chapter will constitute a Basic Law
by itself. Each chapter will be submitted to the Knesset as the committee com-
pletes its work, and all the chapters together shall be the State's constitution.
Id.
194. Id. According to the Harari Resolution, chapters of the Constitution were to
be drafted one at a time. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Knesset legislation, they have no constitutional status in Israel. 197
Basic laws can be altered by legislation adopted by a regular
Knesset majority.19 Once the Knesset alters a Basic Law, courts
do not have judicial review of the amending statute.1 99 One ex-
ception, however, allows for limited judicial review of amending
statutes.2°° Several Basic Laws have been adopted with en-
trenched provisions that require a special majority of the Knesset
to be overturned.2 ' These entrenched clauses have enabled the
Supreme Court to invalidate ordinary legislation passed subse-
quent to a Basic Law when such legislation is inconsistent with
an entrenched provision and has not been passed by the requi-
site special majority.20 2
3. Israel's Political Structure
The State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy that recog-
nizes the voice of the people as sovereign.203 Israel's Govern-
ment is comprised of three branches: the legislature, the execu-
tive, and the judiciary.20 4 Israel's legislature, the Knesset, is a
parliamentary body composed of 120 members. 20 5 The Knesset
legislates law, solves fiscal and economic problems, and ad-
dresses internal and external policy, the state budget, culture,
education, health, and social welfare. 2 6 The Knesset is a multi-
party body elected by a proportional party-list system in which
the entire country forms one constituency. 207 Citizens vote for a
particular party and parties are allotted seats in the Knesset pro-
197. Susser, supra note 19, at 940.
198. Id.
199. Segal, supra note 176, at 20.
200. Id. at 21.
201. Id.; Susser, supra note 19, at 940.
202. Segal, supra note 176, at 21. Entrenchment clauses curb the Knesset's
supremacy to change laws at its will. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized the Knes-
set's constitutive powers to bind itself and future Knessets through entrenchment provi-
sions. Id.
203. ERVIN BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: STATE AND RELIGION IN
ISRAEL 87 (1970).
204. See ASHER ARtAN, POLITICS IN ISRAEL: THE SECOND GENERATION 155-85 (1985)
(describing three branches of Israeli Government).
205. JOSEPH BADi, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 65 (1963).
206. Id.
207. BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 38, 39. The system of proportional representa-
tion was used in the Zionist Organization and in the Jewish Community Organization
under the British mandate. Id. at 38; see FEIN, supra note 9, at 16 (stating proportional
representation is direct carryover from severe factionalism of Zionist Organization).
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portionate to the percentage of votes they receive.20 8 Citizens do
not elect specific Knesset members, rather the parties themselves
appoint leaders as their representatives to the Knesset.2 °9
Rarely, is a single party in Israel able to constitute a majority
on its own.210 Parties must negotiate and build coalitions to
form a controlling bloc that ultimately selects the members of
the executive branch of the Government.211  Through coalition
building, smaller parties are empowered, as larger parties com-
pete for their alliance.21 2 Large parties often bow to the de-
mands of smaller fringe groups to facilitate a majority.2 1 3
Israel's executive branch is called the "Government," and is com-
prised of the Prime Minister, the President, and additional Min-
isters 4.2 1  The Knesset selects the Government,2 1 5 whose minis-
ters are drawn from the leadership of the political parties that
form the majority coalition. 6 After the Government is formed,
it must present itself to the Knesset for a vote of confidence. 7
The Knesset and the Government are closely bound to 'one an-
other and the work of the Government is contingent upon con-
tinued Knesset support.2 1
8
Two concurrent judicial systems exist in Israel, the civil and
the religious court systems.2 1 9 The civil courts are divided into
208. BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 39. Contrary to the U.S. majority system, pro-
portional representation assures that no vote is wasted. Id. Parties with only a small
percentage of votes are represented in the Knesset. Id. They receive fewer seats, how-
ever, than parties that attract a higher percentage of votes. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 31 (stating that single parties do not gain majority in national elec-
tions).
211. SAGER, supra note 6, at 132.
212. ARLAN, supra note 204, at 86. Coalition building has increased the power of
the religious parties, relative to their strength in the community. Id. Religious parties
are consistently the third largest winners in Knesset elections and serve as the coalition
partner of the largest party. Id. In return for the support of the religious bloc, the
largest party satisfies many of their demands. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 164.
215. Basic Law: The Government art. 3. (1992) (Isr.). In an amendment to Basic
Law: The Government, the legislature instituted popular election of a Prime Minister
and directed Israel's Prime Minister to appoint the Ministers that form the Govern-
ment. Id. This new system will be implemented in the 1996 elections. Id.
216. ARIAN, supra note 204, at 158.
217. Shoshana Netanyahu, The Supreme Court of Israel: A Safeguard of the Rule of Law,
5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 15 (1993).
218. ARLAN, supra note 204, at 158-59.
219. HENRY E. BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 197 (1968).
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four levels: (1) municipal courts,2 ° (2) magistrates' courts,221
(3) district courts, 22 and (4) the Supreme Court.2 2 In addition,
four religious court systems operate in Israel: (1) Rabbinic (Jew-
ish), (2) Shari'a (Muslim), (3) Christian, and (4) Druze. 224 Reli-
gious courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the personal sta-
tus of their adherents.2 25
C. Judicial Treatment of Civil Rights
In Israel, civil rights are protected by judge-made law.226
The Supreme Court, through case law, has created an unwritten
constitution establishing fundamental freedoms in Israel that are
commonly protected by written constitutions in other democra-
cies.2 27 Although the Supreme Court has established case law
protecting civil rights, the Knesset, through the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law22 1 ("Marriage
and Divorce Law"), has vested exclusive jurisdiction over the
personal status of all Jews in Israel in Rabbinical courts.2 9
Rabbinical courts strictly apply Jewish law and many secularJews
in Israel view the application of Judaism's restrictive rules as an
infringement on their civil rights, particularly in the area of free-
dom of religion.3 °
220. Id. Municipal courts have criminal jurisdiction over violations of municipal
regulations and by-laws and other specific offenses committed within the municipal
area. Id.
221. Id. at 198. Magistrates' courts, established in all districts and subdistricts, pos-
sess limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. Id.
222. Id. District courts have unlimited jurisdiction as courts of first instance in all
civil and criminal matters not within the jurisdiction of a magistrates' court. Id. Parties
can appeal municipal and magistrates' court decisions to the district courts.
223. Id. at 199. The Supreme Court, Israel's highest court, has jurisdiction as an
appeals court from the district courts in all civil and criminal matters; it sits as a Court
of Civil Appeal or as a Court of Criminal Appeal. Id. The Supreme Court also serves as
a court of first instance, sitting as the High Court ofJustice, over matters that it deems
necessary to grant relief in the interests ofjustice, and which are not within the jurisdic-
tion of any other court. Id. at 199, 200.
224. SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY 106
(1994).
225. See BAKER, supra note 219, at 207-10 (discussingjurisdiction of religious courts
in Israel).
226. Goldstein, supra note 177, at 605; Bracha, supra note 160, at 112-13; Barak,
supra note 7, at 242.
227. Goldstein, supra note 177, at 608; Bracha, supra note 160, at 11.
228. Marriage and Divorce Law, 7 L.S.I. 139 (1953) (Isr.).
229. Id.
230. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that specific applications ofJewish
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1. The Supreme Court
With no written constitution or entrenched bill of rights to
guide and bind the Knesset, the Supreme Court has injected
guarantees of civil rights into the constitutional arena by inter-
preting laws under the presumption that the Knesset does not
intend to curtail civil liberties. 31 Only when the Knesset clearly
and unambiguously expresses an intent to infringe on civil rights
and the law passed is not open to more than one interpretation
will the Court uphold the law and permit the infringement.23 2
By strictly adhering to this presumption, the Supreme Court, in
numerous cases, 23 3 has developed a body of law protecting civil
rights as if a written bill of rights existed. 3 4  Israeli citizens
enjoy many of the same civil liberties as citizens of the United
States.2 35 The Israeli Supreme Court, in its quest to protect civil
rights, has based many of its decisions on U.S. constitutional
law.236 The Israeli Supreme Court follows a model of interpreta-
law in Israel are coercive and violate freedom of religion); S-ARFMAN, supra note 7, at 69
(stating that freedom from religious coercion is one of main civil rights issues in Israel).
231. Segal, supra note 176, at 3. This presumption enables the Court to ensure
that civil rights will be protected. Id. Only a clear and unequivocal intention by the
legislature to curtail basic freedoms can overcome this presumption. Id. Over the past
40 years, the Court has succeeded in modifying the ordinary meaning of statutory provi-
sions so that they will be consistent with the concept of civil rights. Id.; see Bracha, supra
note 160, at 114 (discussing presumption); Shapira, supra note 7, at 287-88 (discussing
presumption).
232. Segal, supra note 176, at 3; Bracha, supra note 160, at 114.
233. See H.C. 148/79 Saar v. Minister of Interior and Police, 34(2) P.D. 169 (Isr.)
(protecting freedom of demonstration); H.C. 448/85 Daher v. Minister of Interior,
40(1) P.D. 701 (Isr.) (protecting freedom of movement); C.A. 165/82 Kibbutz Hatzor v.
Rehovot Tax Assessor, 39(2) P.D. 70 (Isr.) (protecting freedom of property).
234. Bracha, supra note 160, at 112-13; The role of the Supreme Court has shifted
from merely resolving disputes between private citizens to safeguarding the rule of law.
Netanyahu, supra note 217, at 2. The Supreme Court's reluctance to enter the arena of
public controversy has been replaced by liberal rules of standing and justiciability, en-
abling the Court to enter matters in the political arena. Id. Petitioners who raise argu-
ments indicating corruption on the part of a government authority or raise constitu-
tional problems are permitted to bring an actio popularis despite a lack of personal inter-
est. Id. at 3. The public's trust and faith in the Court, apparently, has been enhanced
by its involvement in political matters. Id. at 23.
235. A.M. Apelbom, Common Law a l'Americaine, 1 ISR. L. REV. 562, 565 (1966).
Next to U.S. courts, the Israeli Supreme Court utilizes U.S. jurisprudence more than
any other court in the common law world. Id.
236. Id.; see supra note 8 and (citing specific cases where Israeli Supreme Court
cited U.S. decisions); see also Barak, supra note 7, at 243 (citing examples of Supreme
Court of Israel relying on U.S. cases, articles, and books).
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tion, termed the "Background Understanding Model."23 7 Ac-
cording to this model, Israel is founded on democratic values,
recognizing many unwritten rights, including: freedom of ex-
pression,238 freedom of demonstration, 3 9 freedom of move-
ment, 4 ° freedom of association,241 freedom of property,242 and
the right to a fair trial.243
The foundation for the judicial protection of civil rights,
Israel's Declaration, states that Israel will ensure complete social
and political rights to all its inhabitants. 244 Although not a le-
gally binding document,2 45 Israel's Declaration embodies the
principles and national aspirations underlying the foundation of
the State.24 6 Accordingly, the legislature and the judiciary look
to the Declaration for guidance when considering the rights and
freedoms that should be conferred on Israeli citizens.247 The
Supreme Court established those principles enumerated in the
Declaration as part of the judge-made constitution in its 1953
case, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior,2 48 considered the most im-
portant constitutional decision in Israeli law.2 49 In Kol Ha'am,
Israel's Minister of the Interior suspended the publication of Kol
Ha'am, a communist newspaper, under the 1945 Emergency
237. Segal, supra note 176, at 4.
238. Kol Ha'am, 1 S.J. 90 (1953) (Isr.).
239. Saar, 34(2) P.D. 169 (1979) (Isr.).
240. Daher, 40(1) P.D. 701 (1985) (Isr.).
241. H.C. 253/64Jaris v. District Commissioner of Haifa, 18(4) P.D. 673 (Isr.).
242. Hatzor, 39(2) P.D. 70 (1982) (Isr.).
243. Segal, supra note 176, at 4.
244. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.).
245. H.C. 10/48 Zeev v. Gubernik, District Commissioner, Urban District of Tel
Aviv and Another, 1 P.D. 85, translated in 1 S.J. 68 (1948) (Isr). The Declaration
"[c]ontains no element of constitutional law which determines the validity of various
ordinances and laws or their repeal." Id. at 71-72. The Declaration's sole purpose was
to affirm the establishment of the State in order to gain recognition under interna-
tional law. Id. at 71.
246. Id. at 71-72. "[The Declaration] gives expression to the vision of its people
and its faith." H.C. 262/62 Perets v. Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council, 16 P.D. 2101, trans-
lated in 4 S.J. 191 (1962) (Isr.). The Declaration "[l]aid down the way of life of the
citizens of the State, and its principles must guide every public authority in the State."
Id.
247. Perets, 4 SJ. at 191 (Isr.).
248. Kol Ha'am, 1 S.J. 90 (Isr.).
249. Segal, supra note 176, at 21. "It has been said that this development 'constitu-
tionalized' Israeli law by introducing judicial supervision of primary legislation." Id.
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Regulations, 5 ° for criticizing the Government and, therefore,
causing a situation likely to endanger public peace.25 1
Although the suspension appeared lawful on its face, 252
Supreme Court Justice Agranat invalidated the order, holding
that because the action involved the fundamental right of free-
dom of speech, the legislation was to be interpreted to minimize
the infringement.2 3 If the Knesset wished to infringe on a fun-
damental human right, it had to do so expressly.2 54 Justice
Agranat further explained that the basic concept of democracy,
exhibited in the Declaration, would serve as the Court's princi-
pal guide in its attempt to interpret and give meaning to existing
laws. 55 Kol Ha'am demonstrates how the Supreme Court,
guided by the presumption that human rights must be pro-
tected, is able to interpret legislation that appears to infringe on
human rights in a manner consistent with the promotion and
protection of essential rights.2 56 The Supreme Court found the
basis for protecting the right to freedom of speech not in a con-
stitution or in a bill of rights, but rather in the democratic na-
ture of the State of Israel.257
250. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine Gazette No. 1442, at 1055
(Supp. 2, 1945).
251. Segal, supra note 176, at 21.
252. Goldstein, supra note 177, at 611. The 1945 Emergency Regulations gave the
Minister of the Interior authority to suspend any newspaper that, in his opinion, is likely
to endanger public peace. Id.; Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine Ga-
zette No. 1442, at 1055 (Supp. 2, 1945). The Minister of the Interior asserted that
because the legislation provided for his personal discretion, his action was not subject
to judicial review. Goldstein, supra note 177, at 611. At the very most, he argued that
the Court could only review his decision as to bad faith. Id.
253. Id. at 115.
254. Id. at 108.
255. Kol Ha'am, 1 S.J. at 105 (Isr). Justice Agranat stated:
The system of laws under which political institutions in Israel have been estab-
lished and function are witness to the fact that this is indeed a state founded
on democracy. Moreover, the matters set forth in the declaration of Indepen-
dence, especially as regards the basing of the state 'on the foundations of free-
dom' and the securing of freedom of conscience, mean that Israel is a free-
dom-loving State. It is true that the Declaration 'does not consist of any consti-
tutional law laying down in fact any rule regarding the maintaining or repeal
of any ordinances or laws' . . . but insofar as it 'expresses the vision of the
people and its faith' ... we are bound to pay attention to the matters set forth
in it when we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the State.
Id.
256. Id.
257. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 4 (Isr.) (guaranteeing civil rights); see supra notes
244-36 and accompanying text (discussing adherence to Declaration principles).
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2. Rabbinical Courts
Despite the Supreme Court's active approach in the promo-
tion and protection of civil rights, 25 8 many Israeli citizens com-
plain that their Government encroaches on their right to free-
dom of religion, particularly in the areas of marriage and di-
vorce.2 159  Because religious coercion stems from primary
legislation explicitly stating thatJewish law must govern the mar-
riages and divorces of all Jews in Israel,260 there is little room for
the Supreme Court to reinterpret the Knesset's intent.261 Be-
cause the Declaration provides only guiding principles and not
legally binding norms,26 2 the judiciary cannot invalidate Knesset
legislation even if a particular law violates principles articulated
in the Declaration.263 In addition to being expressly legislated
by the Knesset, laws granting jurisdiction to religious courts, gen-
erally, and Rabbinical courts, particularly, reinforce a deeply
rooted system of governance in the region. 64 This system was
employed in Palestine by the Ottomans2 65 and by their British
successors. 26 6 In 1948, the Israeli legislature passed the Law and
Administration Ordinance 267 stating that the law in existence at
the time of Israel's establishment as a state would remain in
force, thereby facilitating the continuance of the religious court
system and separate autonomous communal development.2 68
Israel acknowledges the many communities that live within
258. See Bracha, supra note 160, at 126 (characterizing Supreme Court's approach
as active).
259. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that specific applications ofJewish
law in Israel violate freedom of religion).
260. Marriage and Divorce Law art. 2, 7 L.S.I. at 139 (Isr.).
261. Cantor, supra note 2, at 209.
262. See Gubernick, 1 SJ. at 71-72 (Isr.) (stating that Declaration does not have con-
stitutional weight and does not determine validity of laws).
263. Cantor, supra note 2, at 209.
264. See Englard, supra note 117, at 196-97 (discussing millet system instituted by
Ottoman Empire); see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (tracing status quo in
Israel to Ottoman Empire).
265. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 196-97 (describing millet system instituted by
Ottomans.)
266. See Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, confirmed by the Council of
the League of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. arts. 10, 15, 16 (preserving autonomy of
religious communities).
267. The Law and Administration Ordinance, 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948) (Isr.).
268. Id. art. 11, 1 L.S.I. at 7 (Isr.); see LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 37
(arguing that Israeli legislature maintained mandatory scheme to preserve harmony
between religious and secular Jews and to avoid making decisions of binding nature).
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its borders and recognizes that their distinct cultures and reli-
gious laws mandate differential treatment.269  The Israeli
Supreme Court's treatment of bigamy exemplifies its conclusion
that it order to guarantee equality, the differences that exist be-
tween communities can not be ignored. 70 In Yosifof v. Attorney
General, Yosifof, an Israeli Jew convicted of the felony of bigamy,
argued that because Israeli law permitted Muslims to marry
more than one wife but prohibited Jews from doing the same he
was discriminated against unfairly.271 The Court rejected
Yosifof's claim.272 Supreme CourtJustice Landau explained that
the Court must examine the issue in the context of the social
realities of the State. 273 He argued that-because communities
possess distinct laws and customs, they must be treated differ-
ently. 274 In determining whether differential treatment is dis-
criminatory, Justice Landau stated that the inquiry must focus on
whether the law discriminates against a community, not an indi-
vidual.2 75
In 1953, the Knesset passed the Marriage and Divorce
Law,27 6 expanding the authority of Rabbinical courts relative to
their authority under Mandatory law.2 77 Presently, all issues re-
269. SeeJACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 30 (discussing exemption of Christian com-
munities to Pig Raising Prohibition Law which reflects majority's desire not to offend
religious minority).
270. SeeYosifofv. Attorney General, 5 P.D. 481, translated in 1 S.J. 174, 185 (1951)
(Isr.) (holding that bigamy was legal for Muslims, but illegal for Jews).
271. Yosifof, 1 S.J. at 185 (Isr.).
272. Id.
273. Id. Justice Landau explained that:
A legislature does not operate in a vacuum, but is faced with an actually ex-
isting social state of affairs with its various manifestations, and must formulate
legal forms to meet that situation, and also direct its development in the fu-
ture. As far as the institution of marriage is concerned, the legislator found
himself confronted, as raw material, with a reality consisting of varied outlooks
which were fundamentally different. It found that the population of the coun-
try was not homogeneous, but that it consisted of different peoples and com-
munities, each with its own laws and customs. Can we say that the Mandatory
legislature committed a breach of the principle of nondiscrimination because
it did not impose its will on the existing situation but to some extent yielded to
reality?
Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 187.
276. Marriage and Divorce Law, 7 L.S.I. 139 (1953) (Isr.).
277. Amnon Rubenstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 3 ISR. L. REv. 380, 387 (1967).
During the Mandatory period,Jews were subject to the jurisdiction ofJewish authorities
only if they were voluntary members of the registered Jewish community. Id. at 388.
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garding the personal status of Jewish citizens and residents in
Israel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of Rabbinical
courts."' The Marriage and Divorce Law did not afford the Jew-
ish community a privileged position over other religious commu-
nities,279 however, it extended Rabbinical jurisdiction to all Jews
in Israel, regardless of whether they voluntarily opted to be a
member of the Jewish community.2 80 As jurisdiction was vested
in Rabbinical courts by the Knesset, a secular legislature, Jewish
law is imposed on all Jews in Israel by the Government and not
by the rabbis.281
This exclusive assignment of jurisdiction over matters of
personal status to the Rabbinical courts has been criticized by
secular Jews as an infringement on the religious freedom princi-
ples outlined in the Declaration.28 2 Judaism has three distinct
streams: Orthodox,283 Conservative, 28 4 and Reform.2 85 Each in-
terpret the biblical commandments in different ways.2 86 The Is-
raeli Government, however, lists the Jews as a single community,
disregarding their distinct approaches to religious practice. 87
The Rabbinical courts in Israel are solely Orthodox and govern
according to Halacha,2 8 the traditional interpretation and appli-
278. Marriage and Divorce Law, art. 1, 7 L.S.I. at 139 (Isr.).
279. Druze Religious Courts Law, 17 L.S.I. 27 (1962) (Isr.). The Druze Religious
Courts Law similarly expanded Druze courtjurisdiction by replacing voluntary member-
ship in the Druze community with membership in the Druze religion. Id. art. 4, 7 L.S.I.
at 27 (Isr.). The law states, in language identical to the Marriage and Divorce Law, that
"[m]atters of marriage and divorce of Druze in Israel who are nationals or residents of
the State shall be under exclusive jurisdiction of the court." Id.
280. Marriage and Divorce Law, art. 1, 7 L.S.I. at 139 (Isr.). "Matters of Marriage
and Divorce ofJews in Israel, being nationals or residents of the State, shall be under
the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts." Id.
281. Id.
282. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that religious legislation violates
citizens' freedom of religion).
283. See DosicK, supra note 69, at 61-62 (discussing Orthodox Judaism).
284. See id. at 62-63 (discussing Conservative Judaism).
285. See id. at 62 (discussing Reform Judaism).
286. See The State of Jewish Belief, in 42 COMMENTARY 71, 71-160 (1966) (surveying
theological differences between Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements). See
generally WALTERJACOB, QUESTIONS AND REFORM JEWISH ANSWERS (1992) (discussing Re-
form movement's approach to specific Jewish practices).
287. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 24. The religious courts that govern
the Christian and Muslim communities in Israel are split into several denominations.
Id.
288. Saul Lubetski, Note, Religion and State: Does the State of Israel Provide the Forum
for the Revival of the Jewish Legal System?, 26 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 331, 333 n.7 (1994).
There are two main sources of Jewish Law: the Torah, written law, comprised of the
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cation of Jewish law throughout Jewish history.289 The majority
of Israeli Jews, however, are not religiously observant. 290 The
Rabbinical courts, therefore, apply norms accepted by a religious
minority to all Jews in Israel.291
D. Interaction: The Status Quo
Religion and state interact at several levels in Israeli law.292
The present status ofJewish law in Israel is based on the premise
that Israel must remain a Jewish state and that national unity
must be preserved. 293 This interactive approach recognizes both
the need to protect citizens' rights to freedom of religion and
conscience and the need to retain Israel as the homeland of the
Jewish people.294
1. Treatment of Judaism Under Israeli Law
In Israel religion and state interact at three levels: the sym-
bolic level,295 the institutional level, 296 and the legislative level.
297
The majority of Israeli citizens do not oppose the interaction of
religion and state at the first two levels. 98 Many secular Israelis,
however, oppose interaction at the third level, arguing that reli-
gious legislation is coercive and violates religious freedom.299
first five books of the Bible, and the Talmud, oral Law. Id. Traditionally, Jews believe
that both the written and oral law were revealed to Moses at Mount Sinai. Id. The Oral
Law was later codified by Rabbinic scholars through a process of commentaries and
debates known as Halacha. Id.
289. Marriage and Divorce Law, art. 2, 7 L.S.I. at 139 (Isr.). "Marriages and di-
vorces ofJews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law." Id.
290. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHrA, supra note 26, at 3. According to sample surveys, 40%
of Israeli Jews defined themselves as secular, 40% as traditional, and only 20% as reli-
gious. Id.
291. Marriage and Divorce Law, art. 2, 7 L.S.I. at 139 (Isr.).
292. LIEBMAN & DON YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 15-28 (discussing three levels of
interaction between religion and state).
293. Id. at 29.
294. SAFRAN, supra note 21, at 200.
295. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHYA, supra note 26, at 15-18. Symbols derived from Jewish
religious tradition are frequently utilized by the Israeli Government. Id.
296. Id. at 18-19. Religious institutions are supported by the Israeli Government.
Id.
297. Id. at 24. Religious legislation consists of administrative regulations that com-
pel citizens to adhere to Jewish law. Id.
298. Id. at 24.
299. SHARFMAN, supra note 7, at 69.
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a. Religious Symbols
On the symbolic level, religion and state are closely
linked.3"' The symbol of the State of Israel, for example, is a
seven-branched candelabrum, chosen for its association as a reli-
gious symbol."0 ' Biblical verses are engraved on public build-
ings, inscribed on banners in state parades and ceremonies, and
frequently quoted by political leaders.3012 The founders of the
State intentionally utilized religious symbols to emphasize
Israel's Jewish character.30 3 Because all Jewish symbols derive
from Judaism, it would be impossible to separate religion from
state on a symbolic level without denying, or at least ignoring,
the Jewish nature of the State.3 0 4 Furthermore, there are virtu-
ally no protests to this practice, even from those who support an
increase in the separation of religion and state.30 The absence
of objection indicates that most Israeli Jews support Israel as the
Jewish State and do not wish to totally divorce Judaism from the
State of Israel.3 °6
b. Religious Institutions
The Knesset has conferred governmental status on many
religious institutions, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.30 7 Orthodox
300. See MERETZ: THE POWER TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE (translation of synopsis of
Meretz Party Platform) (stating thatJewish heritage and law are cornerstones of Israeli
national culture and are given expression in state symbols). See also Sager, supra note 2,
at 1 (stating that name of Israel's legislature, "Knesset," derives from "Knesset Gaudily,"
the supreme legislative authority of the Jews in the fourth and fifth centuries).
301. MAJOR KNESSET DEBATES: 1948-1981, at 220-21 (Natanel Lorch ed., 1993).
During Knesset debates over the flag and symbol of the State of Israel, D. Pinkas, mem-
ber of the Mizrahi party, stated that:
First of all, I would like to express my approval of the Government's choice of
the candelabrum as the State emblem. I regard this as a fortunate decision
since the candelabrum always served as a symbol of true Judaism .... It links
us with our great past in this country, and will, I hope, serve the purpose of
illuminating our path, like the pure light of the candelabrum.
Id.
302. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 16.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. Cantor, supra note 2, at 217. Tel Aviv University Professors' draft constitu-
tion began with the premise that Israel does not aspire to complete separation of reli-
gion and state. Id.
306. LIEBMAN & DoN-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 16.
307. Id. at 18. These institutions include the chief rabbis and Chief Rabbinical
Council, local chief rabbis, local religious councils and rabbinical courts. Id. at 18-19.
The Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of the Interior also fund many religious insti-
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rabbis exercise an institutional monopoly over Jewish institu-
tions3s°8  The central issue debated at the institutional level is
the degree of autonomy granted to religious institutions, and the
extent of the State's authority to oversee the operations and
structure the policy of such institutions.30 9 The case of religious
education in Israel highlights this controversy.310 The non-Or-
thodox Israeli public does not protest government funding of
religious schools; in fact, the funding of Jewish education is as-
sumed to be a function of the Government.311  The secular pub-
lic merely asserts that the State should have the power to super-
vise religious education in these schools.31 2
c. Religious Legislation
The third level of interaction between religion and state,
religious legislation, sparks public debate and receives vehement
objection. 3  Religious legislation is composed of laws and ordi-
nances that compel the public to obey religious commandments,
signifying the State's imposition of Halacha on all Jews, regard-
less of their religious beliefs. 31 "4 A primary example of religious
tutions and the Ministry of Education and Culture provides for a state religious school
system that parallels the state's secular school system. Id. at 19. The State also funds
Muslim and Druze religious courts as well as other Islamic institutions and services. Id.
Generally, the funding of Muslim and Druze institutions are not contested and remain
outside the sphere of the religion-state debate. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 217 (noting that Tel Aviv University profes-
sors' draft for constitution provides for continued governmental support of religious
institutions).
310. Cantor, supra note 2, at 207. The State supports religious education. Id.
Both non-religious and religious public schools are funded by the State. Id.
311. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 21.
312. Id. at 22.
313. Id. at 24. Some argue that opposition to religious legislation stems from the
personal discomfort or inconvenience that it causes, rather than from an objection to
religious coercion. Id. This explains why non-observant Jews who are opposed to cer-
tain types of religious legislation accept religious legislation on a purely symbolic or
institutional level. Id.
314. See, e.g., Days of Rest Ordinance, 1 L.S.I. 18 (1951) (Isr.) (declaring Sabbath
and Jewish holidays as official days of rest). Nationally, the law prohibits the operation
of sectors of the economy that had not operated on Sabbath during the Mandate pe-
riod, such as transportation. LIEBMAN & DON YEHI V, supra note 26, at 39; Pig-Raising
Prohibition Law, 16 L.S.I. 93 (1962) (Isr.) (prohibiting raising and slaughtering of
pigs). Slaughtering is defined as "any killing for the purpose of eating." Id. art. 8, 16
L.S.I. at 95 (Isr.); Foundations of Law, 34 L.S.I. 181 (1980) (Isr.) (mandating that
Court employ principles of freedom, justice, and peace of Israel's heritage when no
guidance from statutes or case law is available).
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legislation, the Marriage and Divorce Law, declaring that mar-
riages and divorces of Jews in Israel shall be performed in ac-
cordance with Jewish religious law,"1 5 is a source of controversy
because Jewish law in the areas of marriage and divorce is viewed
as too restrictive and as an infringement on personal liberty by
non-observant Jews."1 6
2. The Marriage and Divorce Law
Two facets of the application of Jewish law regarding mar-
riage in Israel are criticized by citizens as constituting religious
coercion: (1) all marriages must be performed in Orthodox cer-
emonies;317 and (2) Jewish law prohibits specific unions, includ-
ing intermarriage and the marriage of Cohanim318 to divorcees
and widows.319 Jewish couples in Israel have developed several
methods to cohabit legally despite Jewish law's restrictions on
marriage.3 20 Although the Supreme Court has refused to recog-
nize civil marriage ceremonies,321 marriages performed in pri-
vate ceremonies are recognized by both the Supreme Court and
315. Women's Equal Rights Law, 5 L.S.I. 171 (1951) (Isr.). Even before the pas-
sage of the Marriage and Divorce Law, the rabbinic courts were granted authority over
marriage and divorce through Article 5 of the Women's Equal Rights Law, which stated
that, "This Law shall not affect any legal prohibition or permission relating to marriage
or divorce." Id. art. 5, 5 L.S.I. at 172 (Isr.).
316. SHAumAN, supra note 7, at 80. Rigorous debate surrounded the passage of
this law. Id. at 78. At the time, acting Prime Minister Moshe Sharet argued that it was a
supreme necessity for the unity of the Jewish people and the ingathering of the exiles.
Id.
317. Cantor, supra note 2, at 205. Conservative and Reform Jews are free to per-
form their own marriage rituals, but must participate in an Orthodox marriage cere-
mony to secure official state recognition of their marital status. Id.
318. SHmmrMAN, supra note 7, at 80. Cohanim are Jews descended from the High
Priest Aaron. Id.
319. Id.
320. See Menashe Shava, Civil Marriages Abroad: Validity in Israel, 9 TEL Aviv U.
STUD. L. 311, 311 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of "Cyprus wed-
dings," marriages performed outside of Israel); Pinhas Shifman, Family Law in Israel:
The Struggle Between Religious and Secular Law, 24 ISR. L. REv. 537, 539-42 (1990) (discuss-
ing civil courts' circumvention or religious law, including recognition of private mar-
riage ceremonies and marriages performed outside of Israel).
321. Rogozinsky v. State Of Israel, 26 P.D. 129 (1971) (Isr.). Non-Orthodox Jews
demanded recognition of civil ceremonies, claiming that forcing them to undergo a
religious ceremony violated their religious liberty. Id. The Court denied their request,
ruling that the Knesset had clearly intended to impose Jewish religious law on the mar-
riage of everyJew. Id. Furthermore, the Court claimed it could not endorse civil mar-
riage without legislative guidance. Id.
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the Rabbinical Council.3 22 These private ceremonies must be
performed according to Jewish law, but are performed without
the agency of the Rabbinate.323 For example, the Court created
an exception in the legislative framework when the issue of a
marriage between a Cohen and a widow arose in Rodnitsky v.
Rabbinical Court of Appeals.324 The Court ordered the official rec-
ognition of a private ceremony, holding that the law vesting ju-
risdiction in the area of marriage to the Rabbinical courts did
not intend to apply the full scope of Jewish law.32 5 Supreme
Court Justice Landau explained that enforcement of a purely
religious-based prohibition on marriage would constitute coer-
cion of conscience, 2 ' and that it was incumbent on the Court to
interpret the law in a way that would prevent a clash with the
fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. 27
Marriages that take place outside of Israel are also officially
recognized.3 28 The Supreme Court ordered the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs to register marriages of Israeli couples who mar-
ried outside the State. 329 Thus, marriages between Jews and
non-Jews, or marriages conducted by Conservative and Reform
rabbis can be legally recognized, provided they are conducted
outside the State of Israel. 3 °
Non-observant Jews also viewJewish law regarding divorce as
an infringement on personal liberty.331 From a Halachic stand-
point, the consequences of failing to adhere to Jewish law in mat-
ters of divorce create the most severe danger to national unity.33 2
If a woman fails to obtain a legal, Jewish divorce, her children
from a subsequent marriage or relationship are considered
mamzerim 33 3 and are only permitted to marry other
322. Rodnitsky v. Rabbinical Court of Appeals, 24(1) P.D. 704 (1970).
323. SH MtMAN, supra note 7, at 80.
324. Rodnitsky, 24(1) P.D. 704 (1970).
325. Rodnitsky, 24(1) P.D. at 704.
326. Id. at 712.
327. Id.
328. SHfIuMAN, supra note 7, at 79-80.
329. H.C. 143/62 Funk and Schlesinger v. Minister of Internal Affairs, 17 P.D. 225
(1963) (Isr.).
330. Id.
331. SHA"MAN, supra note 7, at 79.
332. Lubetski, supra note 288, at 369.
333. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 211. A mamzer is 'defined as "a child born to a
married woman from a man not her husband." Id.
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mamzerim.3 3 4 In order for a couple to divorce underJewish law,
the husband must, of his own free will, deliver a decree of di-
vorce, or Get, to his wife.3" 5 In Israel, today, there are husbands
that refuse to divorce their wives.336 Women, therefore, are
forced to agree to their husbands' demands, including eco-
nomic concessions, in order to obtain divorces.3 37
II. Models For Religion And State
Jewish Israelis advocate differing solutions to the religion-
state dilemma in Israel. 33 8 A small minority of religious Jews seek
to establish Jewish law as Israel's constitution. 3 9 A minority of
both religious and secular Jews advocate complete separation of
religion and state, similar to the U.S. model.3 40 Between these
two extremes lie the majority of Israelis. 41 Some Jews defend
the status quo, while others seek to implement greater com-
promises to guarantee freedom from religious coercion.3 4  Most
Israelis support some level of interaction between religion and
state.343 They disagree, however, regarding which aspects ofJew-
ish law the State should recognize. 44
334. Id.
335. Deuteronomy 24:1. The requirement of a get is derived from the Bible:
When a man has taken a wife and married her, and it comes to pass that she
find no favour in his eyes, because he has found some unseemliness in her:
then let him write her a bill of divorce, and give it in her hand, and send her
out of his house.
Id.
336. SH.Ru'AN, supra note 7, at 79. Rabbinic courts may give ajudgment of "com-
pulsory divorce," and district courts can imprison a man until he grants his wife a di-
vorce. Id. Rabbinic courts, however, rarely issue such judgments and even when they
do, the problem is not always solved. Id. There have been cases where men chose to
remain in prison rather than grant their wives divorces. Id.
337. Id.
338. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 28-30 (discussing proposed solu-
tions).
339. EMANUEL RACKMAN, ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION 46 (1955).
340. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 281 (outlining secularists' argument for sep-
aration); YESHAYAHU LEIBOWrrz, JUDAISM, HUMAN VALUES, AND THE JEWISH STATE 180
(1992) (articulating religious argument for absolute separation).
341. SAFRAN, supra note 21, at 200.
342. Id.
343. See id. at 209 (indicating that two-thirds ofJews favor some link between reli-
gion and state); see LIEBMAN & DON-YEHVA, supra note 26, at 16 (arguing virtually no
Jews oppose interaction at symbolic level); id. at 15 (stating most Israelis viewJudaism as
relevant to public order and political system).
344. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 38; see LIEBMAN & DoN-YE-IYA, supra note 26, at
29 (arguing that secular Jews desire maintenance of national unity and historical con-
19961 2157
2158 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:2120
A. The Extreme Positions
Israelis that advocate instituting a theocracy in Israel are
concerned only with adherence to God's commandments. 34 5
They posit that the only way to preserve the Jewish nation is by
preserving Jewish law.346 Theocrats maintain that freedom of
religion and conscience must always be subordinated to Jewish
law.34 7 Israelis at the other extreme, however, advocate com-
plete separation of religion and state both to enhance Israel's
democratic nature and to rescue Judaism from the political
arena.
3 48
1. Theocracy
The theocratic model, advocated by a small minority of Or-
thodox Jews, is not seriously considered by the Israeli Govern-
ment.3 49 The theocratic position maintains that the State of
Israel must function as a religious entity governed solely by Jew-
ish law.35 Jewish law, therefore, would function as Israel's con-
stitution. 351 For theocrats, the preservation of the Jewish nation
is synonymous with the preservation of the Jewish religion and
the State of Israel is viewed as the only appropriate place for the
reinstitution of Jewish law.332
tinuity ofJewish nation, but seek alternative modes ofJewish identity, outside confines
of Halacha).
345. RAcKAN, supra note 339, at 46.
346. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 72.
347. See RACEMAN, supra note 339, at 46 (discussing member of Agudat Israel Party,
Meir David Lowenstien's, argument that adherence to Jewish law should not be matter
of individual conscience).
348. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 280-82 (discussing secularists' argument for
separation); LEIBOWITZ, supra note 340, at 174-84 (discussing religious argument for
separation).
349. See RAcKaMAN, supra note 339, at 35-49 (discussing parties' official statements
during constitutional debate and noting that suggestions to institute Jewish law as
Israel's constitution were disregarded).
350. Id. at 46.
351. Id.; 4 Knesset Protocols 745 (1950) (Isr.), translated in SHA"mAN, supra note
7, at 41 (articulating Knesset Member, Meir David Lowenstien's, demand that Jewish
law serve as Israel's constitution).
352. 4 Knesset Protocols 812 (1950) (Isr.), translated in SHARFMAN, supra note 7, at
41. Objecting to the enactment of anything other than Jewish law in Israel, Minister of
Welfare Yitzhak Meir Levin stated that:
[D]o you think that what our enemies failed to do, what blood and fire failed
to do, you will succeed in doing through the power of the state? No you
won't! You still do not understand the Jewish soul. It will awaken and burst
into a great flame. If in the Holy Land, of all places, we want to turn things
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Theocrats oppose the belief that Jewish identity can take
many forms and argue that Israel's connection withJudaism can-
not be merely cultural or nationalistic."' 3 They posit that even
within the most secular Jew lies a spark of holiness that a reli-
gious state would reawaken and that it is Israel's responsibility to
implement Jewish law and serve as an example of adherence to
its precepts.3 54 According to theocrats, the function of the Is-
raeli Government should be to enforce Jewish law throughout
the State.355 They view the Jewish State as a vehicle for achiev-
ing the transcendent objectives of the Jewish religion.5 6
2. Absolute Separation
Although the slogan, "separation of religion and state," is
injected into Israeli public debate on occassion, 57 no political
party has actually adopted it as a policy position.358 Complete
separation of religion and state is a minority position, extreme
and uncommon, and it is not clear what proponents of this posi-
tion intend when they argue for its implementation. 359 Numer-
ous works have been published detailing the negative impact of
the integration of religion and politics in Israel on both Jewish
law and the political system. 36° Aside from addressing the infir-
mities of the present system and urging the untangling of reli-
gion from the political arena, however, few undertake the task of
upside down and to make the life of religious Jews unbearable .... Don't we
have anything else to do besides starting a Kulturkampf, which, God forbid,
might destroy us and the state?
Id.
353. 4 Knesset Protocols 729 (1950) (Isr.), translated in S1HARFMAN, supra note 7, at
40. Leader of the National Religious Party, Zerah Warhaftig, argued that replacing the
Jewish Bible with a constitution would weaken the connection between the Jewish na-
tion and its religious laws, thereby, decreasing the worldwide status of the Jewish peo-
ple. Id.
354. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 72.
355. Englard, supra note 117, at 188.
356. Id.
357. LrnBowrrz, supra note 340, at 174. The slogan is raised as a theoretical posi-
tion in secular circles. Its advocates do not regard it as a serious political demand to be
realized in the present. Id.
358. Id.
359. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 15.
360. See, e.g., LEIBowIrz, supra note 340, at 158-84 (arguing that interaction of
religion and state corrupts Judaism); S~matMA, supra note 7, at 69-92 (arguing that
religious legislation is coercive); Shetreet, supra note 4, at 207-15 (concluding that en-
forcement of specific religious norms violates freedom of religion).
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elaborating how, precisely, religion and state should be sepa-
rated, what role Judaism should play in the new system, and how
the ramifications of total separation should be dealt with. 6'
Two groups advocate separation of religion and state:3 62 a
minority of extreme religious and secular thinkers. 63 Their rea-
sons for advocating separation, however, are distinct.364 The Or-
thodox separatist position is based on the notion that politics
exploits and corrupts religion.365 Yeshayahu Leibowitz, a lead-
ing religious scholar advocating separation, explains that the pu-
rity of religion must be saved from the political organ. of the
State. 6 6 Leibowitz believes that holiness consists only of the ob-
servance of the Torah and its commandments, and any assertion
that the founding of the State of Israel, a political and historical
event, is embedded in holiness is unjustified. 6 7 Israel came into
existence through the common efforts of Jewish patriots, reli-
gious and secular alike, and patriotism, he asserts, is a secular
human motive and not a sanctified undertaking. 368
Leibowitz claims that the Government utilizes religion, not
for religious purposes, but to gain power.3 69 Absent complete
separation of religion and state, Leibowitz argues that religion
becomes a political tool, used to gain concessions from religious
groups and to advance secular, political objectives. 7 ' Leibowitz
describes the present situation, a secular state, recognizing reli-
361. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, supra note 26, at 15.
362. See Lubetski, supra note 288, at 352-55 (outlining secularist and ultra-Ortho-
dox arguments for separation).
363. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 280-82 (discussing secularist position); LEIB-
OWITZ, supra note 340, at 174-84 (discussing religious position).
364. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 280-82 (discussing secularists' argument that
religion corrupts politics); LEIBowrrz, supra note 340, 174-84 (arguing that politics cor-
rupts religion).
365. LEIBOWrrZ, supra note 340, at 174.
366. Id. at 159. Advocates of religion-state interaction justify the legislation ofJew-
ish law in Israel by maintaining that it is indispensable to a decent social order. Id.
"Justification of religion, is, in effect, its vulgarization." Id.
367. Id. at 175. But see ROGER FRIEDLAND & RICHARD HECHT, To RULE JERUSALEM
148-49 (1996) (advance uncorrected proof on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (outlining Rabbi Kook's argument that secular Zionists were sacred part of
Jewish messianic redemption).
368. LEIBOWTZ, supra note 340, at 175. The founders of the State of Israel did act
not under the guidance of the Torah and its precepts and neither does the State of
Israel. Id.
369. Id. at 176.
370. Id.
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gious institutions and supporting them with government funds,
as neither aiding nor imposing religion. 71 What is imposed is
not true religion, but rather only specific religious provisions
deemed appropriate by political, not religious authorities.1 2
This system rejects the guidance of Jewish law and replaces it
with arbitrary choices fueled by political negotiation.3 73 It serves
political ends and not God, thereby degrading religion. 74 Leib-
owitz believes that when religion ceases to shield itself with ad-
ministrative status, its strength will be revealed and it will be bet-
ter equipped as both an educational and influential force. 75
Separation also will allow the religious community to con-
trol religious institutions in the interest of religion.3 76  The
rabbinate would be empowered to speak with the voice of Jewish
law about all religious issues, not only those authorized by the
State. 77 Leibowitz asserts that the religious community can sup-
port its own agencies and institutions, without aid from the Gov-
ernment.378 Leibowitz concludes, however, that should the com-
munity decide to accept governmental aid, it would be entitled
to such support even after the separation of religion and state
because the community is comprised of taxpayers who share the
burden of the State. 79
Secularists who call for separation believe that separation is
the only way to protect freedom of religion and conscience, as it
would prevent the religious minority from imposing religious
law on the public at large. 80 Shulamit Aloni, leader of the Citi-
zens Rights Movement,38 1 articulates the secularist argument, ar-
guing that the people of Israel should not be confused with the
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 177.
376. Id.
377. Id. Presently, the rabbinate, as a governmental agency, must refrain from
making public statements on urgent religious issues including religious education. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 177, 178.
380. BiRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 281.
381. Sarah Honig, Aloni Rejects Overtures to Return to Meretz, JERUSALEM Posr, Feb. 9,
1996, at 2. Aloni founded the Citizens Rights Movement ("CRM") over two decades
ago. Id. The CRM was a breakaway faction from the Labor party and is now the main-
stay of the three-way coalition which comprises the Meretz party. Sarah Honig, Shula
Blew It, and She Did It Her Way, JERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 26, 1996, at 9.
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State of Israel and that although the people of Israel may volun-
tarily undertake to be guided by religious law, the State must be
a purely secular entity with purely secular ministries. 82 Further-
more, Aloni argues that the State should be prohibited from leg-
islating that the Government take an interest in religious issues,
even when a Knesset majority supports such an interest.383
The separation of church and state in Western democracies,
in general, and in the United States, 8 4 in particular, is based on
the notion that democratic political systems cannot deal effec-
tively with religious issues.3 8 5 The injection of religion into the
political arena, it is argued, has two primary adverse effects: the
stability of the political system is threatened by religion and reli-
gion is undermined and corrupted by the political system.3 86
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,3 87 for example,
which separates church and state, is a product of early U.S. his-
tory and was passed to eradicate persecution against non-mem-
bers of the established church.3 88
The centuries immediately preceding the colonization of
the United States were wrought with turmoil, civil strife, and per-
secution. 89 Established sects, determined to preserve their reli-
gious and political power, jailed, cruelly tortured, and even
killed those with opposing religious beliefs g.3 " The offenses mer-
iting these punishments included: speaking disrespectfully re-
garding the views of ministers of government-established
churches, failing to attend these churches, expressions of non-
belief in their doctrines, and neglecting to pay taxes and tithes
382. 15 Knesset Protocols 1571 (1966) (Isr.), translated in BIRNBAUM, supra note
203, at 281.
383. Id.
384. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (separating religion and state).
385. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHYA, supra note 26, at vii.
386. Id.
387. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
388. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). "No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content
by its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at one
the refined product and the terse summation of that history." Everson, 330 U.S. at 33.
389. Id. at 8.
390. Id. At various times and places Catholics persecuted Protestants, Protestants
persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects persecuted other Protestant sects and they all,
from time to time, persecutedJews. Id. All of this took place with government support.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL26
to support them.39 1
Although a significant number of settlers came to the
United States specifically to escape religious persecution, they
brought the practices of the old world with them and religious
persecution began to flourish in the new world. 92 Individuals
and companies designated to the make the laws that would gov-
ern the colonies were armed with charters, granted by the Eng-
lish Crown, authorizing them to establish churches which all col-
onists, believers and non-believers alike, were required to sup-
port.393 All dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes
and to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers
sought to strengthen the established religion by encouraging ha-
tred of all non-believers. 394
The persecution of the religious sects not in power aroused
the indignation of colonists who wished to preserve freedom and
liberty for all individuals.3 95 A movement to strip the Govern-
ment of all power to tax, support, assist religious groups, or in-
terfere with the beliefs or practices of any individual or group
developed.3 96 Their efforts culminated in the adoption of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, a provision em-
bracing religious liberty.3 97
The metaphor of a wall of separation between church and
state represents a central principle in U.S. constitutional
thought: the State should not involve itself in matters on the
other side of the wall, matters relegated to the private sphere. 9 8
This principle incorporates more than religious freedom.3 9 9 Its
protections from government intervention encompass consider-
ations of race and ethnicity, in accordance with the precepts of
391. Id.
392. See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 1-26 (1994) (discussing colo-
nial establishments of religion); id. at 27-78 (discussing state establishments of reli-
gion).
393. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 11.
396. Id. No single group of colonists can be credited for the protests that eventu-
ally resulted in the adoption of the First Amendment. Id. Colonists from Virginia,
where the established church was a dominant force in political affairs, however, pro-
pelled the movement and served as its leaders. Id.
397. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
398. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 28.
399. Id. at 29.
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modem constitutionalism. °° Thus, the Government is prohib-
ited from making an individual's adherence to a religion or
membership in a specific race or ethnic group relevant to his or
her standing in the political community.40 1 Rather, the political
community in the United States is based on a universal standard
of equality.4 2 Rights inhere in the individual, not the group,
and the Government is charged with protecting those rights.40
One of the effects of the Establishment Clause, therefore, is to
facilitate and encourage assimilation, to replace ascriptive recog-
nition with individual equality. 4 Members of groups are viewed
as U.S. citizens irrespective of their other group affiliations and
the force uniting the U.S. citizens is their common national aspi-
rations.4 °5
The U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of bigamy highlights
its assimilative approach toward community.4 "6 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. United States,4° 7 upheld a federal
statute criminalizing bigamy.4"' The Court addressed whether
the petitioner, a member of the Mormon faith, which permits
bigamy, should be exempted from the statute.40 ' The Court
concluded that every civil government has the right to deter-
mine whether bigamy or monogamy should be enforced and
held that the petitioner could not be exempted from the prohi-
bition on bigamy.41 0 Ten years later, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that exempting members of religions that permitted big-
amy would shock the moral judgment of the community.4 The
Court must have been referring to the nation at large when it
used the word community, as the institution of bigamy could not
400. Id.
401. Id. at 28-29.
402. Id. at 29.
403. Id. at 21.
404. Id. at 30. Religions construct walls to protect themselves from the outside
world; separating religion and state prevents governments from protecting these walls
and, therefore, from protecting specific religious interests. Id.
405. Id. at 9; SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITrCS: THE PROMISE OF DIsHAR-
MONY 24 (1981). Huntington argues that without the values that constitute the Ameri-
can creed, U.S. citizens have nothing vital in common. Id.
406. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 30.
407. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 166 (1879).
408. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1889).
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL
shock or offend the morals of religious communities that permit-
ted bigamy.412
B. Proposed Religion-State Compromises
The majority of Israelis wish to retain the Jewish character
of the State of Israel while, simultaneously, curbing religious co-
ercion.413 They offer a range of possibilities to eradicate existing
religious coercion resulting from the application ofJewish law in
Israel.41 4 Some defend the status quo.415 Others advocate addi-
tional steps toward separation through implementing an interest
analysis test 41 6 or by supporting only those religious laws that
serve primarily secular purposes.41 7 In addition, many Israeli
scholars advocate the revival of the constitutional project and
the establishment of legislative protection of civil rights as the
only means of solving religious-state conflicts. 418
1. Defending the Status Quo
Examining the status quo in the context of the Marriage
and Divorce Law highlights the dimensions of conflict, pro-
pelled by the competing conceptions of Israel as a Jewish
state.41 9 Proponents of the existing system argue that so long as
non-Orthodox Jews are not forced to adopt Orthodox beliefs,
there is no significant breach of religious liberty.4 20 They claim
that Orthodox marriage ceremonies can be regarded as a mere
formality imposed by the State, no more offensive than a com-
412. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 32.
413. SAFA.AN, supra note 21, at 200.
414. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 214-27 (advocating secular primary purpose
test); Lubetski, supra note 288, at 363-70 (advocating interest analysis test and discuss-
ing its application).
415. See SAriAN, supra note 21, at 209 (stating that two-thirds ofJewish Israeli pub-
lic favor status quo).
416. See Lubetski, supra note 288, at 363-70 (presenting interest analysis approach
and its application).
417. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 214. The secular primary purpose test maintains
that if a law serves a primarily secular purpose, it is not considered coercive, even if a
religious purpose is incidentally served. Id.
418. See Shapira, supra note 17, at 125-27 (discussing proposed draft of constitu-
tion); Kretzmer, supra note 17, at 240-49 (discussing first Basic Laws enacted which
protect civil rights).
419. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 205 (characterizing Marriage and Divorce Law as
clearest tension between religion and state in Israel).
420. Id. at 206.
1996] 2165
2166 FORDHAMINTEAATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:2120
pulsory civil ceremony might be to a religious person.42 1 The,
Orthodox rabbi would simply be regarded as the State's mar-
riage registrar.422
Supporters of the status quo maintain that all Jewish legal
prohibitions on marriages and divorces must be upheld, arguing
that disrupting the existing system will open the floodgates to a
mass of intermarriages, which would threaten the continuity of
the Jewish nation.42  Advocates of maintaining the status quo
also contend that any compromise would endanger national
unity,424 and that freeing divorce laws from the jurisdiction of
the Rabbinical courts would irreparably divide the nation.425
This argument, that a change in the status quo would endanger
the unity of the Jewish people, has proven to be politically effec-
tive because national unity is a rational objective that garners
consensus among Israeli political parties.426
2. Interest Analysis
Implementing an interest analysis test would serve to bal-
ance the competing interests of Jewish law and rational, valid
governmental objectives.4 27 According to this test, Jewish law
would be given priority where religion has an overriding interest
in fostering the continued growth of the Jewish community and
government objectives would be served absent an overriding reli-
gious interest.4 28 In the context of the Marriage and Divorce
Law, the harm that would result from not adhering to Jewish law
421. Id.
422. Id. The same sources would concede that Orthodox marriage ceremonies
would constitute religious persecution if Christians or Muslims were forced to marry in
like circumstances. Id.
423. 44 Knesset Protocols 1834 (1966) (Isr.); M. Porush, leader of religious party
Agudat Israel, translated in BIRNBAUM, supra note 203, at 282. "The Torah and religion
are the essence of our existence. Every thought that borders on separation of religion
and state is identical with the separation of the soul from the body. Our people is not a
people except by virtue of its Torah." Id.
424. See Englard supra note 117, at 422, 423 (discussing danger to national unity).
But see LEIBOWITZ, supra note 340, at 180 (arguing that national unity would not be
effected).
425. LIEBMAN & DON-YEHrYA, supra note 26, at 26. A large part of the population
would regard the offspring of any second marriage, performed absent a legal Jewish
divorce, as mamzerim, and, therefore, would be restricted from marrying them. Id.
This could ultimately lead to the creation of two Jewish nations in Israel. Id.
426. Englard, supra note 117, at 202.
427. Lubetski, supra note 288, at 364, 365.
428. Id. at 365.
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would have to be weighed against the governmental interest of
preventing religious coercion.
42 9
The result of this test would provide for civil marriages in
Israel where the consequences of such marriages would not lead
to the birth of a mamzer.430 For example, civil marriages be-
tween a Jew and a non-Jew or between a Cohen and a divorcee
or widow could be permitted because children born to either of
these marriages are Halachicly permitted to marry other Jews
and do not advance the danger of the creation of two Jewish
nations in Israel.43 l Only in a case where a union could produce
a mamzer, who is restricted from marrying other Jews, would na-
tional unity be affected sufficiently to elevate a religious interest
above the governmental objective to protect freedom of religion
and conscience.
3. The Secular Primary Purpose Test
Israeli legal scholar, and Minister of Religious Affairs,
Shimon Shetreet, supports the integration of religion and state,
but argues that only those religious norms which have been
adopted by the society at large can be enforced without violating
religious freedom.43 3 Minister Shetreet argues that if religious
legislation passes a secular primary purpose test,4 3 4 synonymous
with acceptance by enlightened members of society, it should
not be considered coercive. 43 5 For example, thatJewish holidays
and the Sabbath are national days of rest in Israel could consti-
tute religious coercion.43 6 Because the law could be attributed
to a primarily secular purpose, the enactment of a uniform day
of rest, however, that Jewish law is legislated by the State would
not be sufficient to invalidate the law.4 37
429. See id. at 368-70 (discussing application of interest analysis to Marriage and
Divorce Law).
430. Id. at 370.
431. Getsel Ellinson, Civil Marriage in Israel: Halakhic and Social Implications, 13
TRADITION 24 (1972).
432. Lubetski, supra note 288, at 370.
433. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 214. Shetreet argues that religious freedom is vio-
lated only when norms that are not accepted by a consensus of society are enforced. Id.
434. See id. at 214 (defining secular primary purpose test).
435. Id.
436. Days of Rest Ordinance, 1 L.S.I. 18 (1948) (Isr.).
437. See Shetreet, supra note 4, at 214 (making same argument regarding Sunday
as U.S. day of rest).
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Minister Shetreet maintains that the application of Jewish
law in the areas of marriage and divorce constitutes religious co-
ercion.43 8 He argues that because the majority of Israeli citizens
oppose the Marriage and Divorce Law, it conflicts with religious
freedom.43 9 Minister Shetreet continues to explain that several
religious norms exist that should be adopted by official state in-
stitutions despite their lack of societal consensus. 440 He argues,
for example, that the military's adherence to Jewish dietary
laws" 1 is justified not because a majority of Israelis support it,
but because it is a symbol that forges a bond with the history of
the Jewish people." 2 The continued existence of Israel as ajew-
ish state, Minister Shetreet argues, requires government authori-
ties to preserve Jewish symbols and values." 3
4. Toward A Constitution
A constitutional revolution has begun in Israel. 4 " Many
legal scholars assert that the only way to effectively address the
obstacles that the present system places in the path of protecting
civil rights, while at the same time retaining the Jewish character
of the State, is by completing the task assigned to the nation in
Israel's Declaration, the adoption of a constitution. 445 While the
enactment of Basic Laws resulted in some progress toward draft-
ing a constitution, the progress was minimal. 446 Basic Laws
merely addressed structural issues defining the form of govern-
ment to be instituted in Israel and the powers of the Govern-
ment's branches. 447  All issues of contention that originally
thwarted the adoption of a constitution were ignored by the
Knesset.
The development of a judge-made constitution in Israel
438. Id. at 215, 216.
439. Id. at 216.
440. Id.
441. Kasher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, 2 L.S.I. 37 (1948) (Isr.). This law en-
sures that all Jewish soldiers in the Israeli Defense Army will receive kasher food. Id.
art. 2, 2 L.S.I. at 37 (Isr.).
442. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 216, 217.
443. Id. at 216.
444. Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Chal-
lenge in American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 309, 355 (1995). The consti-
tutional revolution began with the enactment of two Basic Laws on human rights. Id.
445. Id. at 323.
446. Id. at 316.
447. Id. at 312.
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caused many to question whether a written constitution was nec-
essary, or even desirable."4 Because the judiciary took such an
active stance in promoting basic freedoms and was successful in
protecting numerous civil rights, scholars pointed to the advan-
tages of an unwritten constitution.44 9 Scholars argued that be-
cause an unwritten constitution is free from precise textual defi-
nitions that often limit rights, it is better equipped to safeguard
freedoms in light of changing circumstances. 450 Although many
were at first satisfied with leaving the protection of human rights
to the judiciary, discontent with the Knesset 451 and with the lim-
ited scope of judicial review allotted to the Court,452 propelled
the notion that the time was ripe to revive the constitutional pro-
ject.
Because certain rights were so controversial, including free-
dom from religious coercion, a proposal was made to enact
human rights provisions gradually,453 following the chapter by
chapter approach outlined in the Harari Resolution. 454 The no-
tion behind this proposal was that after initial legislation was
passed protecting less controversial rights, the issue of religion
and state, a more controversial issue, would receive serious atten-
tion in light of the progress that would have already been
achieved.455 In March 1992, the Knesset passed the first two Ba-
sic Laws addressing civil rights: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupa-
448. Id. at 318.
449. See Segal, supra note 176, at 3 (describing Supreme Court's role in protecting
civil rights); see supra notes 231-45 and accompanying text (discussing judicial protec-
tion of civil rights).
450. Barak-Erez, supra note 444, at 318.
451. Id. at 321. The 1980's marked years of instability in the Knesset where coali-
tion forming increased. Id. With the increase in coalition agreements, the relative
power of small parties also increased. Id. Small interest groups made demands, includ-
ing illegitimate demands, and ruling party politicians bowed to these demands because
they needed the support of these small parties to reach the delicate majority needed to
form a government. Id. The professional community and the public at large grew skep-
tical of the legislature when they believed that ruling parties elevated the need for form-
ing a majority to insure their own power base above public fairness and the will of the
people. Id. at 321, 322.
452. See Bracha, supra note 160, at 112-20 (discussing judicial review in Israel).
453. Amnon Rubenstein, The Strunge Over A Bill Of Rights For Israel, in DANIEL J.
ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 139, 139, 140
(1990). Amnon Rubenstein, Knesset member and prominent constitutional law profes-
sor, proposed this plan hoping that reaching consensus on the definition of a few rights
would stir the dynamics of the constitutional project. Id. at 139, 140.
454. Harari Resolution, 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950) (Isr.).
455. Barak-Erez, supra note 444, at 323.
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tion4 5 6 and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.457
Although these Basic Laws codified several important rights,
they ignored others for fear of opposition from religious par-
ties.458 The problem of religion and state, therefore, was not ad-
dressed.459
Another method employed to advance the constitution pro-
ject was the introduction of a private bill, never passed, entitled
Basic Law: Human Rights." 0 This bill similarly neglected to ad-
dress the issue of religion and state in Israel.46' Amnon Ruben-
stein, one of the drafters of this bill, explained that addressing
religious issues would have precluded the bill from passing.462
Rubenstein agreed to exempt all issues of family law and per-
sonal status, preserving the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Rabbinical courts.463 He addressed his intentional exemption
only by expressing his hope that the two sides could work out a
satisfactory solution in the future."64
III. ISRAEL MUST PROTECT THE CONTINUITY OF THE
JEWISH NATION AND JEWISH NATIONAL UNITY
Although some non-observant Jews complain that the inte-
gration of religion and state in Israel constitutes religious coer-
cion, Israel should not separate religion from state. Israel was
established as a Jewish state and one of its functions is, and
should remain, to promote the continuity of the Jewish nation
and to protect Jewish national unity, at least, within its borders.
Advocates of the extreme positions fail to recognize the impor-
tance of both Israel's Jewish and democratic nature, and there-
456. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Sefer Hakhinukh (S.H.) 90 (1994) (Isr.).
457. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, S.H. 150 (1992) (Isr.).
458. Barak-Erez, supra note 444, at 325.
459. Id.
460. Rubenstein, supra note 453, at 141.
461. Id.
462. Id. Amnon Rubenstein wrote:
Needless to say, we have a very touchy problem with regard to the religious
issue. From the first, both Shulamit Aloni and I, who represent the strong
opposition to the present status quo in matters of religion, accepted the no-
tion that if we insist on the universality of the law with regard to all issues, it
would not have a chance.
Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. Amnon Rubenstein wrote that, "[G]iven the good will on both sides, I
think we can work out some sort of satisfactory solution . . . ." Id.
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fore, do not effectively address the existing conflict. 1 5 Advo-
cates of compromise, who recognize that Israel must protect civil
rights while retaining its Jewish character, disagree as to which
aspects of Judaism merit governmental enforcement and seek to
repeal those laws originally enacted to maintain the continuity of
the Jewish nation and preserve national unity, including the
Marriage and Divorce Law.466 The re-establishment of Jewish
sovereignty in Israel was foreshadowed by thousands of years of
Jewish history where Judaism bound the Jewish nation together,
often only through persecution, despite individuals' attempts to
renounce their Jewish heritage. As a Jewish state, Israel has the
responsibility of supporting Judaism and enacting those aspects
of Jewish law that ensure the survival not only of the Jewish na-
tion, as a collection of individuals, but also as a Jewish commu-
nity.
A. Dismissing the Extremes
Both the theocrats and the separationalists seek to advance
their own interests while discarding the positions of their opposi-
tion.467 Recognizing that preserving the unity of the Jewish na-
tion is an instrumental function of the Jewish State and protect-
ing individual rights is critical to the democratic State of Israel,
extreme positions that disregard either of these essential govern-
mental responsibilities must fail. Instituting either a theocracy
in Israel or strictly separating religion from state is not a viable
option for a government striving to protect both civil rights and
religious interests.
1. Dismissing Theocracy
Enacting Jewish law as Israel's constitution would not
merely fail to remedy the the plight of non-observant Jews in
Israel, it would heighten the conflict and increase complaints of
465. See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text (discussing theocratic model);
supra notes 357-412 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for absolute separa-
tion).
466. See supra notes 427-31 and accompanying text (outlining interest analysis ap-
proach); supra notes 433-43 and accompanying text (discussing secular primary pur-
pose test); supra notes 444-64 and accompanying text (advocating revival of constitu-
tion project).
467. See supra notes 345-405 and accompanying text (outlining theocratic and sep-
aratist positions).
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religious coercion. 468 Because Jewish law is not merely a system
of belief for the individual, but dictates measures to govern all
aspects of society,469 it can not provide the scope freedom of reli-
gion that some Israeli citizens seek. Rather than addressing the
concerns of non-observant Israeli citizens, the theocratic ap-
proach focuses solely on preserving Jewish law for the Jewish na-
tion, regardless of its consequences for the individual.
2. Dismissing Absolute Separation
Despite that non-observant Jews in Israel argue that the ex-
isting position of Jewish law in Israel's legal and political system
curtails their freedom of religion, divorcing Judaism from the
State of Israel would dramatically change the character of the
State and deny Israel's unique history and tradition. Further-
more, it would violate specific principles outlined in the Declara-
tion assuring that Israel is, and will remain, a Jewish state.47°
Advocates of separating religion and state that point to the
United States as the paradigm of a thriving democracy, separat-
ing religion and state and fiercely protecting freedom of reli-
gion, fail to recognize the limitations of the U.S. experience to
Israel. Separation of religion and state was enacted in the
United States to combat religious persecution supported by the
Government. Because Israel is comprised of a majority of Jewish
citizens, it maintained autonomous communal religious institu-
tions, in part, to ensure the Arab community equality. If com-
plaints of religious coercion were expressed by the Arab minority
in Israel, Israel's dilemma would be more similar to the persecu-
tion in the United States that propelled the enactment of the
Establishment Clause. Israel, however, does not share the his-
tory or national experience of the United States. Minorities in
Israel are not persecuted at the hands of the majority. Further-
more, no single religion is supported by the Government at the
expense of any other. Rather, all religions are recognized and
supported by the Israeli Government. Applying the U.S. solu-
tion to the Israeli problem, therefore, must ultimately fail, as it
468. See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text (discussing theocratic model).
469. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing Judaism as religion
for community, not merely individual).
470. See Declaration, 1 L.S.I. at 3, 4 (Isr.) (discussing establishment of Israel as
Jewish state).
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does not address the unique facets of the Israeli dilemma:4 71
government responsibility for the maintenance or religion, in
general, and religious coercion among members of the major-
ity, in particular.
In the United States, attributes of nationhood flow directly
from the political conception of the state. To be a U.S. citizen is
to embrace certain political principles. The United States is a
case of a state creating a nation.47 " Israel's establishment, on the
other hand, was the antithesis of the U.S. founding. The State of
Israel is an example of the political expression of a people al-
ready formed.473 The argument among the majority of Jews in
Israel is over which dimensions of Judaism should receive public
recognition, not whether such recognition is legitimate.4 7 4
One legal scholar, Professor Jacobsohn, draws distinctions
between the U.S. and Israeli approaches toward community
through their contrasting treatment of bigamy.475 Unlike the
United States, Israel, as the cradle of three religions, accepts the
responsibility of protecting the religious interests of religious
communities. The Knesset provides different protection to each
community, therefore, in order to facilitate equality,47 6 a notion
that has been rejected in the United States. 4 77
Separation of religion and state in the United States has fa-
cilitated the advancement of Jewish individuals, but not the con-
tinuity of the Jewish nation. The Jewish community in the
United States is not unified.478 Orthodox and Reform leaders
vehemently oppose each other on a wide array of religious issues
471. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 205. Ben Gurion stated that:
The convenient solution of separation of Church and State, adopted in
America not for reasons which are anti-religious but on the contrary because
of deep attachment to religion and the desire to assure every citizen full reli-
gious freedom, this solution, even if it were adopted in Israel, would not an-
swer the problem.
Id.
472. JACOBSOHN, supra note 2, at 37.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 38.
475. See id. at 31-35 (contrasting U.S. and Israeli courts' treatment of bigamy).
476. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (discussing Israeli Supreme
Court's treatment of bigamy which highlights Israel's recognition of distinct religious
communities).
477. See supra notes 406-11 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme
Court's refusal to exempt Mormons from laws prohibiting bigamy).
478. Stewart Ain, Fightin' Words, JEwIsH WEEK, March 29, 1996, at 14. A Reform
leader stated that, "[i]t is all very well to sloganize that 'we are one'... but in fact we
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including intermarriage and the definition of who is a Jew. Re-
cently, the Reform movement adopted the doctrine of patrilin-
eal descent which violates Halacha by accepting as Jews children
born to Jewish fathers.4 79 The Reform movement is not keeping
records of those Jews which the Conservative and Orthodox
communities would not consider to be Jewish. It is quite possi-
ble that in two generations observant Jews will be forced to sepa-
rate themselves entirely from the Reform community because
they will be unable to ascertain who is Jewish for the purposes of
marriage. This fragmentation of the Jewish community is pre-
cisely the situation that the laws in Israel were enacted to pre-
vent.
B. Analyzing Compromise
Advocates of compromise recognize the Israeli Govern-
ment's responsibility to both preserve national unity and to pro-
tect civil rights. 480 Legal scholars disagree, however, as to the
balance that should be struck between these competing inter-
ests. Although several suggested solutions theoretically seem to
adequately give force to both religious and secular concerns, ap-
plying these solutions to practical conflicts, such as the Marriage
and Divorce Law, exposes their flaws.
1. Attacking The Status Quo
Clearly, in the context of the Marriage and Divorce Law, the
compromise achieved by the civil courts, the recognition of pri-
vate marriage ceremonies and marriages that are conducted
outside the State,481 is an attempt to preserve the symbolic value
of religious marriage, while at the same time creating outlets to
ease the restraints of religious prohibitions. Although it does
make circumventing the law possible, it is wrought with contra-
have ceased to be one and I strongly advise that we recognize that fact and proceed."
Id.
479. Gary Rosenblatt, Quick Fix Judaism Doesn't Work, JEwIsH WI-, Mar. 29, 1996, at
5.
480. See supra notes 427-63 and accompanying text (discussing three proposed
compromises: interest analysis approach, secular primary purpose test, and revival of
constitutional project).
481. See supra notes 320-29 and' accompanying text (discussing civil courts' circum-
vention ofJewish law).
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL
diction and fails to formulate a clear policy on the role religion
should play in the area of marriage.
Although recognizing marriages that take place abroad and
in private ceremonies does not remove Jewish law from the polit-
ical arena, it creates a situation where the dangers that Jewish
law seeks to avoid can flourish.48 Developing methods to cir-
cumvent Jewish law erodes the law, but it does not destroy it, as
outwardly, the law of the State continues to accord legal force to
religious law.483 The question that needs to be asked is whether
the interests served by maintaing Jewish laws without full en-.
forcement are important enough to justify merely providing
loopholes in the existing system to prevent religious coercion
and not changing the actual law.
2. Flaws in Determining Which Jewish Laws Protect Jewish
Continuity and National Unity
Arguably, the interest analysis approach 48 4 was the very test:
employed by the founders of the State of Israel, resulting in the
status quo. As the religious parties originally sought to enact.
Jewish law as Israel's constitution, they agreed to the status quo
precisely because it preserved Jewish law in those areas that they
deemed closely linked with national unity and the preservation
of the Jewish nation. That the suggestion to reapply an interest.
analysis test has been raised exemplifies that citizens' percep.
tions regarding what fosters national unity and the perpetuation
of the Jewish nation is changing. For example, when the status
quo was adopted, preventing the loss of Jews to intermarriage
was perceived as critical. If the interest analysis test were to be
reapplied and civil marriages to be instituted in Israel, 485 it is
likely that at a later date yet another application of this test
would be sought. Instituting civil marriages suggests that the
only the birth of mamzerim contributes to the demise of Jewish
unity, while the consequences of intermarriage will not.
Arguments labeling specific Jewish precepts as instrumental
482. See supra notes 423-24 (discussing threats to continuity ofJewish nation and to
national unity).
483. Shifman, supra note 320, at 542.
484. See supra notes 427-31 and accompanying text (discussing interest analysis ap-.
proach).
485. See supra notes 430-31 and accompanying text (advocating institution of civil
marriages in Israel).
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to the preservation of the Jewish nation are subjective as factions
within Judaism interpret the binding nature of precepts differ-
ently.4 8 6 One must understand, however, that religious Jews do
not argue for the legislative enactment of Jewish law to bind
themselves. Despite the secular laws of the State, religious Jews
will continue to live within the confines of Halacha. They argue
for the implementation of Halacha precisely to bind those Jews
who would not otherwise adhere to Jewish law. The very nature
of this system is coercive, but advocates of maintaining the status
quo deem the minimal coercion justified because the interest it
protects is the very preservation of the Jewish nation.
Furthermore, the question remains as to whether religious
authorities or secular politicians should be charged with deter-
mining which laws have an overriding religious interest. Indeed,
the answer to this question will impact critically on the ultimate
laws adopted. Not only is there dissention between religious
leaders on the meaning of several Biblical commandments, but
also there are several matters for which there is no settled Hala-
cha at all.48 7 Rather, a continuum of opinion exists as to the true
nature of the meaning of these Jewish precepts. 488 A secular leg-
islator cannot enact a law containing two conflicting, undecided
opinions and would, therefore, be required to resolve the dis-
pute himself.48 If the secular legislator, who possesses no Ha-
lachic authority and may not feel compelled to protect religious
interests, decides Halachic questions then Halacha will be com-
promised and the legislator's decision, although rooted in reli-
gious law, will not be recognized by religious communities.49 °
The very nature of the Halachic process provides the framework
for this situation to flourish. Jewish law is so controversial that it
is possible to find support for almost any desired outcome.491
486. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (discussing Orthodox, Con-
servative and Reform Judaism and their approaches to Biblical commandments).
487. Izhak Englard, The Problem ofJewish Law in a Jewish State, 3 ISR. L. REv. 254, 267
(1968).
488. Id.
489. Id. In Halachic codifications, two conflicting approaches to a law are often
enacted. Id.
490. Id. at 268.
491. Id. Justice Silberg commented that:
Our legal material is so rich and so controversial that in fact one can find
precedent for any desired view. Obviously for the Dayan [religious judge] this
does not facilitate a decision in the actual case he is trying, but it certainly
eases for the codifying legislator the choice of the abstract principle. For the
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While religious authorities seek to curb their practices to Jewish
law, the secular legislator could merely choose the opinion most
desirable to suit secular, rather than religious needs.492
3. Flaws in the Secular Primary Purpose Test
Minister Shetreet's secular primary purpose test493 avoids
addressing the central issue of the Israeli dilemma regarding
religion and state: what does being a Jewish state entail. That
Israel is a Jewish state that recognizes religion, suggests that it
can legislate laws to protect religious interests without assigning
the laws a secular purpose.494 Merely retaining all laws that serve
a secular purpose, while discarding those that only protect reli-
gious interests, would be tantamount to an absolute separation
of religion and state. Furthermore, underlying the validity of the
secular primary purpose test is the notion that laws fashioned to
serve only religious needs should not be upheld. If Israel is to
continue to exist as ajewish state and as a safe haven from perse-
cution for all Jews, it must protect at least those Jewish laws that
are essential to the preservation of the Jewish nation.
Minister Shetreet's exception to the secular primary pur-
pose test, the allowance of religiously based laws that foster a
bond with the past of the Jewish people, despite the absence of
societal consensus,495 fails to clearly articulate how to determine
which laws should be afforded this privileged status. Minister
Shetreet labels the Marriage and Divorce law coercive,496 while
maintaining that statutes protecting Jewish dietary laws in the
military should be permitted according to this exception. The
consequences of eradicating Rabbinical courts' jurisdiction over
codifier's function is different from that of a decidingjudge: the latter is obli-
gated to find the accepted opinion, whereas the former is allowed to chose the
desirable one.
Id.
492. Id.
493. See supra notes 433-42 and accompanying text (outlining secular primary pur-
pose test).
494. Yosifif, 1 S.J. at 195 (Isr.) In his concurring opinion, Supreme CourtJustice
Silberg commented that Israel views, as its resposibility, "the maintenace and regulation
of particular forms of living and cultural values in which that particular section of the
community is interested, and which it holds dear." Id.
495. See supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text (discussing exception to secu-
lar primary purpose test).
496. See supra notes 438-38 and accompanying text (labeling Marriage and Divorce
Law coercive under secular primary purpose test).
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the marriages and divorces of Jews, however, would be so severe
that, despite a lack of societal consensus, the Marriage and Di-
vorce Law should be upheld. The Marriage and Divorce Law
facilitates a crucial bond with Jewish history and Jewish identity
by preventing intermarriage and preventing the creation of two
separate Jewish nations within Israel. Unfortunately, Minister
Shetreet does not address why the link to Jewish history is fos-
tered to a greater extent by adherence to dietary laws than by
adherence to laws that dictate who, in fact, is Jewish and who
Jews are permitted to-marry.497
4. Redefining the Constitution Project
Although the constitution project 498 recognizes the impor-
tance of individual liberties and of maintaining the Jewish char-
acter of the State, it avoids making principled decisions on the
issue of religion and state that might alienate religious parties. 499
The gradual approach of extending legislative protection to civil
rights, which advocates for enacting a constitution propose, 0 0
could, indeed, produce legislative protections of less controver-
sial rights. Without a definitive policy regarding the role that
religion should play in Israel, however, it is unlikely that the
mere momentum of the constitution project would propel a so-
lution to this intricate and emotionally charged dilemma.
CONCLUSION
Despite the multi-faceted dimensions of the conflict sur-
rounding religion-state issues in Israel, the Knesset must articu-
late a clear role for Jewish law in Israel's legal system. While
Supreme Court decisions that facilitate the circumvention of
Jewish law prevent percieved religious coercion, they confuse,
rather than illuminate the role that Jewish law should be af-
forded in the Jewish State. Satisfying both secular and religious
Jews in Israel is a difficult task as harmonizing Jewish law with
complete freedom from religious coercion is impossible.
497. Shetreet, supra note 4, at 215-17.
498. See supra notes 444-63 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to enact con-
stitution and bill of rights).
499. See supra notes 461-63 and accompanying text (discussing exemption of reli-
gion-state issues).
500. See supra notes 453-54 and accompanying text (advocating gradual approach
to legislative protection of civil rights).
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Although it is unlikely that a consensus among the Jewish nation
will ever be reached on issues of Jewish nationalism, Jewish law,
and their relationship to each other, the State of Israel must con-
tinue to strive toward unifying a divided Jewish community, per-
petuating the continued existence of the Jewish nation, and serv-
ing as a light unto all other nations, while minimizing govern-
ment encroachment on individual freedoms.
